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1 Introduction 
The liberalisation of the energy market within the EU began in 1988 and had major 
consequences for the organisation of gas exports from the Norwegian continental shelf. The 
EU’s purpose of establishing an internal energy market was to improve the conditions for 
consumers and secure future supplies of energy for its member states. Europe is the most 
important market for Norwegian gas and liberalising the European gas market caused a 
reorganisation of the Norwegian gas regime. The reasons for this were the extensive 
economic ties between EU member states and Norway and the EEA agreement. 
Energy is a necessity of almost all economic activity, which makes it an important part of 
both national and international politics. The energy sector’s vital importance for the 
Norwegian economy makes it a suitable topic for further analysis of the relationship with the 
European Union. By analyzing the impact of EU directives concerning natural gas and their 
impact on Norwegian petroleum industry I hope to illustrate the workings of the Norway-EU 
relationship as a whole and the implications of EU energy policy on national regulations. 
Comparing this to the impact of the liberalisation process in Russia will shed light on what 
changes can be attributed to the EEA agreement and what has been caused by other factors in 
the market for natural gas. 
The topic is academically interesting because Norway’s role as an oil- and gas producing 
country and exporter has become increasingly vital to the Norwegian economy and society for 
the last 40 years. At the same time it is of significant importance in shaping Norway’s role in 
international relations, especially facing the EU. Historians and engineers alike are claimed to 
regard “energy as the most important input factor in the industrial and economic 
development”, which further underlines the importance of energy politics in both Norway and 
Europe (Nordeng, 2006).  
Energy policy is a large topic concerning three major political fields: security policy, 
environmental policy and economical policy. The best way to analyse the Norwegian 
relationship with the EU is through the economical part of energy policies. This does not 
mean that environmental or security policy is less important, but this is a side to energy policy 
that has a more global dimension, through NATO and international climate agreements, 
among others. 
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The share of natural gas in petroleum exports has risen from almost insignificance in the 
1970s to accounting for over half of the total Norwegian petroleum export since 2010 
(Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, 2013b). During the 25 years since the European 
Commission introduced its plan for an Internal Energy Market, the Norwegian gas regime has 
been reorganised. I attribute this to a combination of factors mainly caused by the 
liberalisation of the European gas market. By dividing EU influence into two channels I have 
been able to systematise the sources for effects on the Norwegian and the Russian gas 
regimes. It is the total influence through these channels; the political channel and the 
commercial channel, which has accounted for the different outcomes of EU liberalisation in 
Norway and Russia.  
1.1 Relevant research 
Several scholars have provided their insights on energy relations between Norway and the 
EU, most notably Ole Gunnar Austvik and Dag Harald Claes. It is a field that has been 
heavily researched, probably because of its major impact on Norwegian society. Some studies 
focus on the political aspects of Norway and EU relations and others are rooted in political 
economy. Austvik’s research concerns mainly political economy. Claes, together with Janne 
Haaland Matlary, have provided heavily to the field of political science. Here follows a 
presentation of the existing research on energy policies in Norway, the EU and Russia. 
Matlary’s book, Energy Policy in the European Union, was published in 1997 and introduces 
an account of the situation from before the European liberalisation process had reached full 
momentum. The nationalised gas industry of Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and 
others is thoroughly explained and provide background information on the controversies the 
liberalisation caused within the EU, before it was adopted as official EU policy through the 
several Gas directives. The focus of Matlary’s work has remained on the European side, not 
in the Norwegian area (Matlary, 1997). 
The latest work by Austvik and Claes is an external report commissioned by the EEA Review 
Committee concerning the EEA-agreement and Norwegian energy policy, EØS-avtalen og 
norsk energipolitikk. Rapport #8. The report offers an extensive analysis of how the EEA-
agreement has altered the Norwegian system for gas exports. It underlines the clash of two 
ideologies, the Norwegian model of strong governmental management and the liberalized EU 
ideology. It also includes a short paragraph on the consequences for other export countries of 
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gas to the European market, namely Russia and Algeria. The paragraph introduces the idea 
that the consequences of EU liberalisation have been very different in Russia than in Norway 
without discussing it any further. The main discussion of their report revolves mainly around 
political impacts, whereas my focus will revolve around the consequences for the whole gas 
regime (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 27). 
Claes has written several books and articles concerning the EU’s influence in Norway, 
especially concerning the EEA-agreement, among them Utenfor, annerledes og suveren?. 
Norge under EØS-avtalen first published in 1999. This account assists in contextualising the 
topic of this thesis by placing the consequences for the Norwegian gas regime into a wider 
context of EU impact on Norwegian policies (Claes & Tranøy, 1999, pp. 151-173).  
Austvik’s works focus on the political economy of the liberalisation of the European gas 
market and the consequences for the Norwegian gas regime. He has provided insights on the 
system of Norwegian gas exports and how Norway is affected by European liberalisation. The 
book Norwegian Natural Gas Liberalisation of the European gas market analyses the 
liberalisation process from a Norwegian point of view. Its theories are based on economics 
and emphasises the economic impacts of EU liberalisation in Norway. Based on his results he 
encourages the Norwegian state to form a strategy to secure Norwegian interests in the future. 
In addition he addresses a topic he often returns to in his works, the fact that Norway stands 
alone in the global energy market. The arguments for this loneliness is the fact that despite 
common interest with the EU culturally and economically (in terms of welfare), Norway has 
conflicting interests with the EU when it comes to gas exports (Austvik, 2003, pp. 14-16).  
Together with Svein S. Andersen Austvik has written a report where they discuss how EU 
legislation and development in several fields has become a central premise for Norwegian 
policies. It also questions to what degree the Norwegian government has the freedom to act 
inside a framework provided by EU law (Andersen & Austvik, 2000, p. 8). 
As previously mentioned, the report by Claes and Austvik launches the idea of a comparison 
with Russia, another large exporter of gas without taking the discussion much further. None 
of the above mentioned books or articles provide an in-depth analysis of the consequences in 
Russia of EU liberalisation. By examining the situation in Russia, who does not have an 
equivalent of the EEA-agreement with the EU, it is possible to show the difference in the 
degree of influence the EU has over Norwegian and Russian gas exports. 
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The research concerning the Russian gas industry is vast and it has been a challenge selecting 
the relevant sources for this thesis. Much of the available literature in English is written from 
a European perspective and there is an almost hostile undertone in some articles concerning 
Russia, especially in newspapers and magazines. The sources have therefore been selected 
after careful evaluation of their credibility. Jonathan P. Stern has published The Future of 
Russian Gas and Gazprom and “Soviet and Russian Gas” as a part of the book Gas to 
Europe. The Strategies of Four Major Suppliers, which both provide a neutral description and 
analysis of Russian gas industry and EU relations. The analysis revolves around the primarily 
state owned Gazprom, the Russian counterpart to Norwegian Statoil. Gazprom holds the 
largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is responsible for all gas sales to Europe from 
Russia and is effectively a monopolist. The Russian giant has been forced to restructure its 
production and exports and Stern discusses whether this has been a result of EU liberalisation 
or if it has other causes (Stern, 2005). Erik Houlleberghs and Alexander Zaslavsky have 
written Power, Personalities and Political Risk. Inside Russia’s Oil and Gas Industry which 
deals with the political landscape of Russian gas exports and the reformation of the Russian 
gas industry. However, the study was published in 2004 and can therefore be outdated in 
some fields (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004). This has been taken in to account and 
supplemented by several articles of a newer date from renowned journals like International 
Affairs and Europe-Asia Studies. Together they provide a neutral account of the consequences 
of EU liberalisation in Russia.  
1.2 Main research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how and if the EU as an importer of natural gas 
changes the conditions for Norway as an exporter. Norway is integrated with the European 
Union through the EEA agreement and through extensive economic ties between private 
actors in the natural gas industry. The deepening of the integration towards the EU has greatly 
influenced the Norwegian gas regime. Global, European and national conditions have 
changed since the early 1990s when the EEA agreement was negotiated. Together with the 
deepening of the integration towards the EU, it has altered the Norwegian gas regime far more 
than was expected. One of the reasons for this is the EEA agreement, which first was thought 
not to greatly affect the energy sector in Norway. But the liberalisation of the Internal energy 
market inside the EU the affected the Norwegian gas regime and ended up being one of the 
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biggest conflicts between Norway and the EU, despite Norway not being a complete EU 
member.  
Petroleum resource management, the Norwegian policy of concession management and the 
power market are areas that have undergone big changes and influenced the development of 
the Norwegian gas regime. When analyzing the effects of market liberalisation on the 
Norwegian gas regime, there are two main areas that must be considered: the consequences 
for the gas industry and the adaptations in Norwegian gas policy. My primary concern will be 
the effects on the participants in the gas regime and I will shed further light on the topic by 
comparing it to its Russian counterpart. 
The main research question for the analysis in this master thesis will be as follows: 
What are the consequences of the liberalisation of the European gas market for the 
Norwegian gas regime? 
This will be complemented by sub questions and two hypotheses to help investigate and 
answer the proposed research question. To improve the analysis I will compare the 
consequences of EU liberalisation in Norway with the consequences in Russia. 
1.3 Method, approach and sources 
This thesis will address the relation between Norway and the EU from the perspective of 
contemporary history. I will provide a qualitative analysis of the different participants in the 
Internal Energy Market both on the supply and demand side and discuss the consequences of 
the liberalisation process for the Norwegian gas regime. Thus I will provide deeper insights 
and understanding to the way EU policies affect both national regulations and the economy in 
Norway. 
The paper will provide an analytical narrative and cover the history of the Norwegian gas 
regime. The relevant timeframe will begin in 1988, when the European Commission decided 
to include the energy market in the Single market and continue to 2013 (EU, 1988). The 
narrative is not limited to this period and some background information from the 1960-70s is 
also provided. Adding up to date statistics will also contribute to a productive discussion. 
The thesis is composed of two units of qualitative analysis concerning Norway and Russia. In 
order to evaluate the main research question it is necessary to provide the details of the 
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Norwegian gas regime to clarify how it has been affected by the European liberalisation 
process and later compare it to the Russian system. The Norwegian gas regime includes the 
framework of national regulations and participants on the supply side of the European energy 
market and together with the analysis of the consequences for the Norwegian gas regime, it 
will make up the first unit of the thesis, which deals with Norway. The second unit will 
concern Russia and involves a similar, but shorter, analysis of the Russian gas regime. 
Finally, the thesis will be completed by a comparison between the two units based on the 
findings in the qualitative analysis. The comparison with Russia is included to provide further 
insights in the reasons for the strong influence of EU law on Norwegian society and industry. 
Included in this analysis is the study of relevant primary sources together with secondary 
sources. The primary sources are EU directives, reports to the Norwegian Storting 
(“Stortingsmeldinger”), speeches and other official documents from the EU and the 
Norwegian authorities, in addition to the vast amount of statistics available online. 
Secondary sources provide data of primary sources and render an interpretation based on the 
information. These sources include a selection of articles, reports and books. The use of 
different types of sources provides enough insights to evaluate the topic thoroughly. 
Some sources must be approached with caution, especially articles from newspaper and 
magazines. The chosen newspaper articles are only from periodicals with a clear focus on 
energy, namely Dagens Næringsliv and Teknisk Ukeblad and used mainly to provide 
additional perspective, not as a primary source of information.  
The same caution applies to websites. I rely heavily on information found online and have 
considered each source carefully. Especially the online resources of energy companies seek to 
present themselves in a positive light. Therefore I have only used these resources for statistics 
and facts about operations and ownership. 
The amount of available literature and easy access to primary sources has made the need for 
interviewing representatives from the different sectors superfluous and would probably not 
have provided further insights. Therefore I chose not to include this in the final thesis. 
1.4 Structure and arguments 
The Norwegian management of the energy sector, specifically natural gas, is described in the 
second chapter. It provides an immediate presentation of the consequences of the internal gas 
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market for the Norwegian gas regime. It explains the development of the gas industry from 
small scale exports to today’s situation where Norway is the second largest exporter of natural 
gas to the European Union. The Norwegian government’s official goal for its gas policies is to 
maximize profits to the best of Norwegian society and welfare and this will also be described. 
A presentation of the export management and an explanation of the relationship between the 
Norwegian state and Statoil, the largest gas export company on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf (NCS), are included as an important part of the second chapter. 
Chapter three deals with the function and purpose of the liberalisation of the European gas 
market and makes use of the following proposition: What are the driving forces behind the 
EU liberalisation and what is its purpose? By providing an answer to this question I can 
explain the EU liberalisation process and show its effects. In this chapter I show how the 
European Union’s interest towards the gas market deviates from Norwegian interests and how 
the EU has implemented a package system of several directives during the last 25 years to 
create an Internal Energy Market (IEM). The members of the EU are highly dependent on 
importing energy and wish to secure future supplies by integrating the energy markets and 
ensure low energy prices for consumers and the industry (Eurostat, 2012). Explaining the 
function and purpose of the liberalisation through the package system of directives will 
provide a necessary foundation for further analysis of the main research question.  
Chapter four contains the main analysis of the consequences of the liberalisation of the 
European gas market on the Norwegian gas regime based on the results from the presentations 
above. In the first part of the chapter I will investigate the claim that the dissolution of GFU 
was a direct consequence of the liberalisation by providing insights on the historical 
development of Norwegian gas sales and discussing the first hypothesis:  
Without the pressure from the EU, Norway would have kept the GFU arrangement and long-
term contracts. 
In the second part I will concentrate my study around the following hypothesis:  
The establishing of Gassco and Gassled is a direct consequence of the liberalisation of the 
European gas market.  
A discussion focused around these hypotheses will provide an answer to the main research 
question by illustrating the consequences by the two cases. 
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The purpose of chapter five is to evaluate the influence of EU liberalisation in Norway by 
applying the case of Russian gas exports as a backdrop to emphasize the case of Norway. By 
comparing two states in a similar situation in their role opposite the EU, but with different 
forms of EU cooperation, I will be able to determine the reason for the reorganisation of the 
Norwegian gas regime. The first part of chapter five includes a presentation of the Russian 
gas regime and answers the question of the consequences for Russia, the largest supplier of 
natural gas to Europe, from the liberalisation of the European gas market. The second part is a 
comparison of the consequences for the Russian and Norwegian gas regime based on the 
following question:  What are the similarities between the Russian and Norwegian gas regime 
and why have they been affected differently by the gas market liberalisation? The comparison 
shows that the total impact of the IEM have had similar outcomes for the industry and both 
Gazprom and Statoil have had to implement similar measures in dealing with the increased 
competition on the EU market. But the governmental involvement in each country’s gas 
sector has been affected differently due to the different range of the legal cooperation between 
the EU and each country. 
Chapter six will make the conclusion that the framework of Norwegian gas exports has been 
altered by the process towards an IEM. However, the income from gas exports has continued 
to rise and Norwegian gas policy of maximizing the profit from petroleum export does not 
seem to have been affected. It will also contextualise the conclusion by showing how the 
chosen topic can illustrate the relationship between Norway and the European Union in 
general. 
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2 The Norwegian gas regime 
The Norwegian gas regime is a part of a larger international system and the complex 
organisation designed to serve national interests has had to adapt to international conditions. 
By providing a presentation of the organisation of the Norwegian gas regime, I will provide a 
foundation for further analysis of the main research question in the following chapters.  
The EU liberalisation process has been a crucial factor in the development of a Norwegian gas 
regime. By presenting the shape of today’s gas regime I illustrate the consequences of EU 
liberalisation and thereby answer part of the main research question. The reasoning behind the 
EU influence and the progression of the consequences are given in the analysis in chapter 
four, but it is important to determine the structure of today’s gas regime early on in the 
analysis, to gain a clear image of the end results. 
The construction and operation of the Norwegian gas delivery network and the organizational 
structure of the gas sector has grown into its currents shape over the last forty years. By 
presenting the enormity and sophistication of the whole system concerning gas exports from 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), I can show that the Norwegian gas regime has not 
been reorganised easily. The term “Norwegian gas regime” describes the first parts of the 
supply chain for gas from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) to Europe, namely 
production and transmission. This system includes the production companies, the operator of 
the gas delivery network in the North Sea and the Norwegian Government who operate within 
a framework given by Norwegian Law with the aim of maximising value creation from 
petroleum activities and includes prudent resource management. The term includes the 
framework of national regulations and participants on the supply side of the European energy 
market. Norwegian law is highly influenced by the European Union through the EEA-
agreement and it is the goal of this thesis to clarify the consequences of EU involvement on 
the Norwegian gas regime.  
In this chapter I will also provide an answer for the following question: What is the reason for 
government involvement on the Norwegian continental shelf? The answer lies mainly with 
the major source of income that the petroleum export represents for the Norwegian state and it 
is also given in the ten oil commandments, featured in chapter 2.3. The large income 
accumulated by the Norwegian state emphasises the importance of gas exports for Norwegian 
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society and politics. The changes the gas regime has undergone since the start-up in the early 
1970s can be attributed to both external and internal factors and the subsequent chapters will 
determine which ones can be attributed to the EU and how it was achieved. 
The Norwegian official policy for the petroleum sector and export of natural gas is clearly 
stated in Report to the Storting no. 38 (2001-02).
1
 The stated goal is to maximise the total 
socioeconomic performance from activities on the NCS. The state ownership in the petroleum 
sector is meant to secure a strong Norwegian involvement and achieve high returns to the 
State through the SDFI arrangement and the taxation system. This chapter will provide a 
detailed description of the Norwegian management of the energy sector to show how, and if, 
the State achieves the set goals for the export of natural gas. The following description is 
together with the account of the Internal Gas Market in chapter three, important to lay the 
groundwork for a productive discussion of the main research question in chapter four. It will 
also contain an account of the Norwegian gas regime, including the set framework and the 
participants, and the income from gas exports, to further underline its’ importance to 
Norwegian economy. 
2.1 From small scale to big producer  
Natural gas consists primarily of methane (CH4), but also contains other hydrocarbons such as 
ethane, butane, propane and naphtha. In its primary form, natural gas can be used for 
residential heating and cooking, for industrial purposes and as fuel, or it can be converted into 
electricity at a gas power plant. The majority of Norwegian gas production comes from 
associated gas which is found together with oil deposits (Statoil, 2008b). Several gas fields 
were developed during the 1970s and the position of natural gas from the NCS grew rapidly 
and continued to rise during the 80s. The income from petroleum exports became even larger 
than anticipated and the petroleum sector became indispensable in the Norwegian economy 
(Andersen & Austvik, 2000, p. 12). This is clearly illustrated by the petroleum sector’s share 
                                                 
 
1
 “Statens overordnede mål er å maksimere det samlede samfunnsøkonomiske resultatet fra virksomheten på 
norsk kontinentalsokkel. I tillegg til direkte inntekter fra petroleumsvirksomheten, vil også verdien av for 
eksempel industriutvikling, nasjonal kompetanse, arbeidsplasser mv. inngå i totalbildet av det 
samfunnsøkonomiske resultatet av virksomheten. Det statlige eierskapet i petroleumsvirksomheten har som mål 
å sikre at selskapene beholder en sterk forankring i Norge, samt å oppnå en størst mulig avkastning til staten. 
SDØE er sammen med skattesystemet viktig for å sikre fellesskapet inntekter fra petroleumssektoren.“ (Ministry 
of Petroelum and Energy, 2001-02, p. 109) 
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of GDP from 1972 to 2012, see table 1. In 1972 the share of GDP was 0, 18 percent and rose 
sharply in only ten years. It then remained fairly stable throughout the 1980s and 90s and 
reached 23, 24 % by 2012. The table also shows the rise in exports from the early 1970s and 
the increased share of state revenues during this 40 year period. By 2012 the petroleum 
industry’s share of Norway’s total value creation was 23 percent (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2013e).   
Share of GDP Share of exports Share of state revenues
1972 0,18 0,92 0,12
1982 15,50 35,17 19,90
1992 12,87 33,70 9,49
2002 18,50 45,14 24,50
2012 23,24 51,70 30,27  
Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators for the petroleum sector (Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, 2013b) 
The NCS was dominated by Norwegian companies and SDFI throughout the nineties, with 
Statoil as the largest company. Statoil is still the largest company on the NCS and is 
responsible for 75 percent of Norway’s gas exports (Statoil, 2008a).  
2.2 The gas delivery network 
The gas sector involves three main areas; production, transmission and sales. The production 
is performed by the company which owns the license to a specific gas field and transmission 
involves the transport of natural gas through high pressure pipelines with large capacity from 
the production site to the consumer. The step concerning sales involves local distribution by 
distribution companies in Europe (Claes, 2003, p. 16). The Norwegian government controls 
the two first steps of the supply chain involving gas from the NCS and make up what I refer 
to as the Norwegian gas regime. 
94,7 % of the natural gas from the NCS is transported through high pressure pipelines from 
63 gas producing field on the NCS to receiving terminals on the Continent and in Great 
Britain. 4,1% of the total export is LNG (liquefied natural gas). LNG is transported from the 
Snøhvit-field by ship to Spain and Japan among others. The total Norwegian natural gas 
export was about 113, 7 billion Sm
3
 in 2012.
2
 See appendix A for a list of receiving terminals 
                                                 
 
2
 Sm
3
: Standard cubic meter. Volume measurement for natural gas. 
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and percentage of total volume distribution (SSB, 2013) & (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2013c). These enormous volumes and the large share of transmission by fixed 
pipelines, highlights the Norwegian dependence on stability and predictability in the supplied 
region to ensure a stable income to the Norwegian Treasury. 
As mentioned above, natural gas consists of ethane, methane, butane, propane and naphtha. 
The quality of natural gas varies and the costumers request different varieties, so the gas has 
to processed. This mainly happens in the largest processing plant on the mainland, Kårstø in 
Rogaland, where the gas is processed in to dry gas and wet gas. Dry gas is mainly composed 
of methane and is transported through the high pressure pipelines to one of the 8 receiving 
terminals on the European Continent and Great Britain. As of 2013, the transport capacity of 
the Norwegian pipelines is about 120 billion Sm
3
 per year. In 2012, 107, 6 billion Sm
3
 was 
delivered to the market from the NCS. The pipelines are 7975 km long; this equals the 
distance from Oslo to Cuba (Valmot, 2013). The actual gas delivery network is managed by 
Gassco and owned by Gassled, which will be further described in chapter 2.4.2. The 
production companies sell their own gas, mainly to large companies on the European 
continent. Statoil is the largest among the export companies on the NCS. One of Statoil’s 
largest customers is E.ON (formerly known as Ruhrgas), Germany’s biggest distribution 
company, which delivers gas to the customers through a network of local distributors. See 
figure1 & 2. 
A typical supply chain for Norwegian natural gas starts in the Åsgard-field on Haltenbanken 
in the Norwegian Sea. The development of the Åsgard-field was completed in 1999 and 
involved the building of Europipe 2. It was the largest in the history of Statoil and meant that 
Haltenbanken would be connected to Germany through the gas delivery network. The gas is 
extracted from subsea reservoirs and transported to Kårstø where it is processed. From there 
the gas delivery is sent through Europipe 2 and reaches Dornum in Germany a couple of days 
later. From the receiving terminal a local distributor sells the gas to consumers and local 
industry. The Åsgard-field delivers about 11 billion Sm
3
 to the European continent each year 
and enables a house in Hamburg to be heated with gas from the Norwegian Sea. This project 
illustrates very clearly how the European demand for natural gas led to huge investments on 
the NCS and also explains the industries preference for long-term contracts, an issue that will 
be further addressed below (Statoil, 2007). 
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Figure 1 Norwegian gas infrastructure. Existing and projected pipelines (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2010) 
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Figure 2 Pipelines in Germany (E.ON, 2013b) 
 
2.3 Export management 
Development and operation of the gas delivery network is very capital intensive and therefore 
a large provision has to be secured before development. Because of this, long term contracts, 
was favoured by the Norwegian government and all gas sales used to be administered by the 
Gas Negotiating Committee (Gassforhandlingsutvalget, GFU).  The EU viewed this as an 
obstacle to free trade and it was discontinued in 2001 after a long conflict with the 
Commission. I will discuss this further in chapter 4.4. 
Today, each production company on the NCS have individual sales agreements with buyers in 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, The Czech 
Republic, Austria and Denmark. Gas can be sold to a country without it having a direct 
contact point with the Norwegian gas delivery network. For example, gas can be sold to 
Austria, which does not have a direct contact with the NCS due to the lack of coastline. This 
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is made possible by the extensive gas network on the European continent and third-party 
access to the network, which is a consequence of EU liberalisation (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2013c). This will be thoroughly explained in chapter 3. 
2.4 The participants of the Norwegian gas regime 
The Norwegian gas regime involves several participants and describes a system of private 
actors with a strong state, operating both as regulator and owner. This is a presentation of all 
actors present in the Norwegian gas regime and their role within the given framework in the 
current situation. In chapter four I will provide a narrative of the circumstances during the 
1990s and 2000s in my evaluation of the effects of the IEM on the Norwegian gas regime. 
The Ministry of petroleum and energy (MPE) represents the Government in the Norwegian 
gas regime and is responsible for the SDFI and for the State’s shareholdings in Statoil, Petoro 
and Gassco (Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 2013b).  
The MPE is also responsible for the licensing system on the NCS. The system is an 
expression of the Norwegian government’s exclusive right to the management of resources on 
the NCS. The MPE awards production licenses to able production companies after an 
application process. When Norway became an EEA member, the MPE could no longer award 
production licenses based on nationality or the State’s share in the company. This will be 
further discussed in chapter 3.3.8. 
The State’s direct financial interest (SDFI) is an arrangement that entails the Norwegian 
state’s involvement as an investor in the Norwegian petroleum sector. It was established in 
1985 by splitting the license share held by Statoil in two between the state and the company. 
In contemporary media it was referred to as the wing clipping of Statoil. The claim was that 
the government implemented the division to prevent Statoil from becoming too powerful and 
potentially threaten the democracy (Krogh, 1987, p. 50). However, this is a discussion 
demanding a thesis of its own. But it shows that this process was not easy or without conflict. 
As a result of the SDFI-arrangement every investor in projects on the NCS pays a share of the 
exploration costs and operating costs and in return receives a matching share of the revenues. 
The SDFI operates as any other investor in this matter and the resulting income, expenses and 
investments are channelled in to the central government budget. The net cash flow is 
transferred in to “The Government Pension Fund – Global”. As of October 2013 the SDFI has 
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a direct financial interest in 158 fields and 15 joint ventures for pipelines and inshore 
facilities. The SDFI represents a large source of income for the Norwegian state and was 
estimated to be valued at NOK 1,140 billion as of January 2012. The SDFI holdings are 
managed by Petoro AS (Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 2013c).  
Petoro is in charge of managing the aim of maximizing the State’s profit from the petroleum 
sector. The company also has responsibilities in monitoring Statoil. The foundation of Petoro 
is a result of the privatisation of Statoil. Before 2001 Statoil was the manager of SDFI, but 
this arrangement could not continue when the company was opened up to private ownership. 
The solution was to set up a new state owned company, Petoro (Petoro, 2013). 
Gassco is the neutral and independent operator of all gas transport from the NCS and is 
owned by the Norwegian state. The enterprise was founded by MPE in May 2001 and has 
been responsible for the gas delivery network since January 2002. Before that, the pipelines 
had been operated by several companies but was then reorganised into one company. The 
neutrality of Gassco is important in order to ensure equal treatment of all users and efficient 
use of the resources on the NCS (Gassco, 2013a). This is a requirement brought on by the EU 
and the establishing of Gassco will be discussed further in chapter 4.5 where I hypothesise 
that the liberalisation of the European gas market was the reason for the foundation of Gassco. 
Gassled is the owner of the gas delivery network. It is a partnership of mainly petroleum 
companies operating on the NCS. The major owner is Petoro with a share of 45, 793 %. 
(Gassco, 2012) In recent years German, Canadian and Arabic State funds have bought shares 
in Gassled after Statoil, among others, sold 24,1 percent of its shares in 2011 for NOK 17,35 
billion (Lindeberg, 2013). The selling companies founded the sale of their shares in the need 
for reorganising their investment portfolios (Fadnes, 2011). For details on ownership of 
Gassled, see Appendix B.  
As stated earlier, the Norwegian government’s goal for the gas sector is to maximize profits 
for the good of Norwegian society. Therefore, the government regards it as very important for 
the state to play a role as a substantial, long term and stable owner in order to retain a 
Norwegian base for Statoil (Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 2013a). Statoil is the largest 
operator on the NCS with 80 percent of oil- and gas production and is also responsible for the 
technical operation of the high pressure pipelines. (Statoil, 2012) As of October 2013 the 
largest shareholder is the Norwegian state with 67 percent ownership. Statoil promotes and 
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sells its own gas together with gas from SDFI and is responsible for the sales of 75 percent of 
Norwegian gas. As a result, Statoil is the second largest seller of natural gas in Europe with a 
market share of 14 percent (Statoil, 2008a). 
Currently there are a total of 37 companies operating on the NCS, both Norwegian and 
foreign. Among them are E.ON and GDF Suez, large distributors of natural gas in Europe 
(Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, 2013a). The European distributors and import countries 
are also participants in the value chain, but remain primarily on the demand side and will be 
further described in chapter 3. 
2.5 Statoil and the Norwegian government – relations and partnership 
The objective of the government’s oil- and gas policy is to contribute to the best possible 
management of the resources on the NCS to secure a high value creation and that a high 
amount of the revenue is for the benefit of the community (Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 
2001-02, p. 101). State ownership in Statoil is a prerequisite to achieve the set goals because 
of Statoil’s dominant position on the NCS and as of March 2013 the State’s share was 67 % 
(Statoil, 2013).  
The Norwegian state’s intentions concerning energy policy were stated in a Report to the 
Storting in 1971. It included a 10 point declaration of how the oil operations on the NCS 
would benefit the whole country and became known as the ten oil commandments, see table 2 
for details. Although they only referred to oil production, it is relevant for all petroleum 
production, including natural gas, and contributed to set the course and decide the shape of 
Norwegian petroleum policy for the next 40 years.  
The first and the seventh commandment is especially relevant concerning the heavy 
government involvement in operations on the NCS and coincides with the goal of maximising 
profits for the good of Norwegian society. Commandment number eight was fulfilled shortly 
after the Report to the Storting was submitted by the foundation of Statoil in 1972. Statoil was 
an important component in the Norwegian model of petroleum governance and remains so 
today, despite changing conditions and revisions of ownership structure (Lerøen, 2010). 
Although the company was partly privatised in 2001, the State’s role on the NCS is secured 
through ownership of Statoil as operator and by the role as regulator of the petroleum sector. 
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 The 10 oil commandments 
1 National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the NCS. 
2 Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way which makes Norway as 
independent as possible of others for its supplies of crude oil. 
3 New industry will be developed on the basis of petroleum. 
4 The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing 
industrial activities and the protection of nature and the environment. 
5 Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be accepted except during brief 
periods of testing. 
6 Petroleum from the NCS must as a general rule be landed in Norway, except in 
those cases where socio-political considerations dictate a different solution. 
7 The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a 
coordination of Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the 
creation of an integrated oil community which sets its sights both nationally and 
internationally. 
8 A state oil company will be established which can look after the government’s 
commercial interests and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and 
foreign oil interests. 
9 A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel which reflects 
the special socio-political conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
10 Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s 
foreign policy. 
Table 2: The ten oil commandments (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011) 
2.6 Income from natural gas exports 
As indicated in table 1, the importance of petroleum exports in the Norwegian economy has 
increased dramatically the last 40 years and with it the importance of natural gas. However, it 
is also important to clarify how the Norwegian government receives its income from natural 
gas exports. 
Norwegian gas deliveries are very stable and therefore well regarded in Europe. Gassco 
delivered gas to the land terminals on the Continent and Great Britain with a regularity of 99, 
69 % in 2012.
3
 Consumers in Europe depend on a continuous supply of gas. As a 
consequence securing regularity is one of the most important goals for Gassco to maintain the 
                                                 
 
3
 Regularity is measured as the volume delivered from the transport system in relation to shipper orders. 
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reputation of gas from the NCS and thus sustain the high income from natural gas exports 
(Gassco, 2013b). Norwegian gas is mainly exported to Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and 
France and covers between twenty and forty percent of total consumption in Europe 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013c).
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the importance of gas has only increased in the last decade. In addition 
the share of gas production has risen from 21 % of total petroleum production in 2000, to a 
total of 51 % in 2012. Production has more than doubled since 2000, from 25,2 million Sm
3
 
o.e. in the first half of 2000 to 55,4 million Sm
3
 o.e. in the first half of 2013 (SSB, 2013).
4
   
This is a record breaking high and means a 14 % increase from 2011 (Dagens Næringsliv, 
2013b). The estimated value is NOK 250 billion, which is equal to a quarter of the total 
Norwegian state budget (Førde, 2013). There is no doubt that the export of natural gas has 
been a success story for the Norwegian economy so far. 
The State receives its income from gas sales through the direct involvement on the NCS with 
the SDFI-arrangement and from taxations and fees. It also benefits from the 67 % ownership 
in Statoil and the resulting surplus. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD), the State’s total income from the petroleum industry in 2011 was around NOK 350 
billion. This came mainly from taxation and fees of the production companies (209 billion). 
Net cash flow from SDFI contributed with NOK 127 billion and the dividend from Statoil 
was NOK 13 billion. See appendix C for historical statistics of petroleum income. In total, the 
income from petroleum export has risen dramatically in the last ten years. As of 2010 the 
quantity of natural gas sold from the NCS has surpassed the amount of oil in the total 
petroleum export (Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, 2013b). These figures support the ever 
increasing importance of gas exports for the Norwegian economy and also explain the gas 
regime’s willingness to put up a fight when the EU tries to change the conditions of the 
energy market, as it did when introducing the IEM by liberalising the European gas market. 
An important factor concerning the export of Norwegian gas is that almost all gas production 
is exported to the EU. Does this make the Norwegian gas regime vulnerable? Security of 
supply is an often used term which favours multiple suppliers and diversification of energy 
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 Sm
3
 o.e.: Standard cubic oil equivalent. 1000 Sm
3
 natural gas = 1 Sm
3
o.e. Used when comparing oil and gas, 
typically for statistics concerning total petroleum production. (Petroleum Safety Authority, Norway, 2003)  
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sources to secure the future supply of energy by reducing vulnerability. But what is Norway’s 
security of demand? 95, 9 % of Norwegian gas was exported to European countries in 2012, 
divided between eight different receiving terminals on the Continent and Great Britain 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013c). This highlights an often addressed concern, the 
Norwegian economy’s dependency on exports and subsequent vulnerability towards 
fluctuation in petroleum prices. The political solution for this is welcoming an EU framework 
for the gas market to operate within. A common legal framework creates predictability and 
stability for all parties in the gas value chain. It also explains the reason for the Norwegian 
depolitisation of gas sales (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 547). By purely relying on 
commercial factors and not let political considerations, Norway emerges as a professional and 
trustworthy supplier and thereby contributing to Norway’s future as a gas supplier and 
securing the supply of demand. As will be shown later on, Norwegian protests towards the 
liberalisation process revolved around EU intervention in the Norwegian gas regime, not the 
IEM itself. 
2.7 Macroeconomic features – the future of Norwegian natural gas 
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, gas sales are expected to peak at a level 
between 105 and 130 billion Sm
3
 in 2020, while sales are expected to be reduced to between 
80 and 120 billion Sm
3
 in 2025 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013c). High oil prices 
are reducing oil’s share of primary energy and is substituted by other fuels outside the 
transport sector and makes room for more gas. For example, the share of gas fuelled cars is 
expected to rise and hence expanding the market for natural gas (BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2012, 2013).  These expectations are from industry sources and should be 
approached with caution as they have reason to remain optimistic facing their shareholders. A 
recent report from the European Gas Advocacy Forum is a prime example of this as it 
promotes natural gas as the saviour of both the environment and the economy whilst 
representing the biggest sellers of natural gas on the European Continent (European Gas 
Advocay Forum, 2011).
5
  
                                                 
 
5
 The European Gas Advocacy Forum is composed of: Centrica, Eni, E.ON Ruhrgas, Gazprom Export, GDF 
Suez, Qatar Petroleum, Shell and Statoil. All of them major actors in the European gas market. 
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In the most recent Report to the Storting concerning the petroleum sector form 2011, the 
government expresses optimism for the future of Norwegian gas based on the available 
statistics and the industry’s optimism on its own behalf. In the report, the government 
authorities do however express concerns about the increasing costs of petroleum production 
due to technological enhancements. Based on this, a certain apprehension can be detected 
concerning the future income from gas exports (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 
8). 
On the other hand, the EU’s aim to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and increase the amount 
of “green” energy towards 2020 is not promising for the future income of Norwegian gas. 
Although natural gas is considered to be a greener source of energy than oil, it is still a lot less 
green than renewable sources, such as wind power, which is a major priority in several 
member states (Energy 2020).  Based on these facts many claim that the Norwegian 
petroleum industry is facing a leaner future and the income from gas sales will plummet 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2013a). Several economists are also slightly pessimistic due to the 
increasing availability of shale gas from the United States. Some even call it a shale gas 
revolution and it may force Norwegian production upwards because of lower prices in the 
coming years (Grimsrud, et al., 2013).  
The Norwegian industry and government is generally very optimistic concerning the future of 
Norwegian gas and foresee a continued large income from gas exports. There is however 
critical voices, mainly economists and environmental organizations, claiming the future of 
natural gas is looking bleak and that shale gas from overseas will drive the prices down. Only 
the future will tell the outcome, but in the meantime, investments in the NCS remain high. 
2.8 Chapter conclusion 
The complex system that has emerged from the goal of maximising the performance of gas 
sales from the NCS makes up Norwegian gas regime. This master thesis aims to determine the 
consequences of EU involvement for gas sales from the NCS and this has been shown by 
presenting the different participants in Norwegian gas sales and determining the organisation 
of today’s structure. 
The EU has conflicting interests with Norway concerning gas sales and permitting it to 
influence the organisation of operations on the NCS has not been a conflict-free process. By 
presenting the large revenue the Norwegian gas regime receives from this industry, showing 
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the complexity and clarifying the method of governmental involvement in the gas sector, I 
contribute to the understanding of Norwegian resistance towards the consequences of EU 
liberalisation for the Norwegian gas exports.  
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3 Function and purpose of the Internal Energy Market 
The working proposition for this chapter will be the following: What are the driving forces 
behind the EU liberalisation and what is its purpose? By providing an answer to this question 
I can explain the EU liberalisation process and show its effects. As a result I can show both 
the process and reasons behind the consequences of liberalising the Norwegian gas regime. 
The presentation of the liberalisation process will also clarify the differences between the EU 
and Norway in terms of ideology and governmental involvement. The EU tends to favour a 
liberal approach when faced with a challenge, while heavy governmental involvement has 
been the solution chosen in Norway. These structural differences meet in the European gas 
market, together with the differing interests of each party, creating a complicated conflict of 
interest. 
The European Union’s interest concerning the gas market partially deviates from Norwegian 
interests. Natural gas is a crucial part of the European energy mix and a vital piece in the 
process towards integration of the energy market.
6
 This presentation of the construction of the 
Internal Energy Market will focus on the gas market, but it is important to stress that this 
process also includes the liberalisation of the electricity market and some of the relevant 
directives apply to both sectors. The main objective of the liberalisation process is to fully 
integrate the whole energy market for gas and electricity to provide consumers and businesses 
with lower prices and improved services. According to the EU this is best achieved by fully 
integrating the gas market and harmonising energy legislation in each member state (EU, 
2013c). Norwegian interests are described in the preceding chapter and involve an energy 
policy targeted towards maximising income from gas sales. This causes a collision of 
ideologies which will be discussed further in chapter four. However, the discussion demands 
insights on the European gas market and the process of liberalisation. The following chapter 
will provide a detailed description of the purpose and of the implementation of a European 
Internal Energy Market. 
The term liberalisation involves the removal of or reduction in the trade practices that 
prevent free flow of goods and services from one nation to another (Business Dictionary, 
                                                 
 
6
 The term energy mix is a general description of the composition of a geographical area’s energy supply, 
including crude oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear energy and renewable energy. 
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2013a). In this case it concerns the goal of creating a single internal market for energy within 
the EU by the removal of natural monopolies and facilitating gas transit and transmission 
between member states. The EU consists of several member states with different policies and 
priorities. In this context it is the directives already approved by all the member states that are 
relevant and is the official policy of the Union and represents all the members. The term EU 
will therefore represent the Commission as an advocate for common EU policies. 
The EU has implemented a package system of several directives during the last 25 years to 
create an Internal Energy Market (IEM). The members of the EU are highly dependent on 
importing energy and wish to secure future supplies by integrating the energy markets and to 
ensure low energy prices for consumers and the industry. This chapter will provide a step by 
step walkthrough of the directives concerning liberalisation of the energy market and will also 
address the progress and the controversies that have occurred concerning the liberalisation 
process. The many participants in the European gas market are a major part of the explanation 
of the slow progress in creating the IEM. 
3.1 The European gas market 
The discovery of the enormous Groningen gas field in the northern part of the Netherlands in 
1959 marks the beginning of the European gas market. The find also opened up the possibility 
of hydrocarbons north of the field, in the North Sea, and became the driving force that led 
companies to start drilling for oil and gas in formerly unexplored areas, both onshore and 
offshore (Whaley, 2009). Since then the European gas market has grown enormously and 
natural gas has become an important part of the energy mix. In 2010 a little over 25 percent of 
the total energy consumption in EU member states was natural gas, involving a steady rise in 
consumption by both households and industry since 1995 (European Commission, 2012, p. 
10). 
Before the liberalisation process the gas market was characterised by few suppliers and 
national or regional monopolies on the European side. The monopolies can be described as 
natural monopolies which occurred because establishing competing, parallel pipelines would 
not be profitable due to the high costs of development. Maximizing the transport capacity 
would be far more lucrative. Therefore the owner of the pipeline would have a natural 
monopoly. The monopoly situation in the gas network on the continent was the main obstacle 
of liberalisation of the gas market (Feragen, 2005, p. 42). The solution was unbundling, the 
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separation of the owner of the infrastructure and the owner of the gas, which will be reviewed 
in chapter 3.3. 
3.2 Participants in the European gas market 
The participants in the European gas market make up the downstream sector of the European 
natural gas industry. The term downstream sector refers to the marketing and distribution of 
natural gas, as opposed to the upstream sector which includes the exploration and production 
of natural gas. The EU gas market is dominated by the gas companies, but also includes the 
transmission system operators, the suppliers and the consumers. All participants operate 
within a framework designed by and monitored by the EU. 
The EU is primarily represented by the European Commission, more specifically the 
Directorate-General Energy (DG Energy). The Commission has been the most important 
promoter of the Internal Energy Market (IEM) and is responsible for the implementation of 
the liberalisation process.  
Transmission system operators (TSOs) are companies operating within a given geographical 
area with much of the same responsibilities as Norwegian Gassco. They are independent 
operators of the transmission system for gas providing non-discriminatory network access. 
The companies are often partly privatised and partly state owned. Examples are Open Grid 
Europe in Germany and Fluxys in Belgium (Open Grid Europe, 2013b) & (Fluxys, 2013). 
The establishment of these companies was a direct result of the liberalisation process, where 
so called unbundling has been a vital part. This issue will be addressed in chapter 3.5.  
Large gas companies buy gas from external suppliers or produce it themselves and sell it to 
local distributors or distribute it to the consumer themselves. The ownership structure is 
different for each company; some are largely state owned while others are private. Examples 
are: GDF Suez in France, ENI Distrigas in Belgium and E.ON in Germany. Several major gas 
companies have formed an association called Eurogas to promote the use of natural gas in 
Europe. Eurogas has 48 members (Eurogas, 2013). Some of the European gas companies are 
also involved in upstream activities, like exploration and production in the supply countries. 
For example, E.ON holds several licenses for production through its subsidiary E.ON E&P 
Norge AS in the North Sea and is also involved upstream in Russia and Algeria (E.ON, 
2013a). 
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Costumers in the EU import gas from a few countries and the majority of imports are brought 
in by high pressure pipelines. The main suppliers from outside the EU are: Russia (Gazprom), 
Norway (Statoil) and Algeria (Sonatrach), see Figure 3. Several EU countries are gas 
producers, however only the Netherlands is able to produce adequately for inland 
consumption. The Netherlands is the largest producer of natural gas in the EU, producing 40 
percent of the total consumption in the Union. Germany produced only 13 percent of its own 
total consumption in 2010 and was largely dependent on imports. The UK produced a little 
over half of its own consumption. All other EU members are also net importers of natural gas, 
except the Netherlands and Denmark (European Commission, 2012).  
 
Figure 3: Main origin of natural gas imports EU-27 in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
The share of natural gas in the total energy mix in the EU is 25 percent, but this varies widely 
between member states. It depends on the country’s own gas supply and the maturity of the 
gas market. The share of natural gas is almost 40 percent in the UK energy mix, but in 
Sweden this share is only 2, 6 percent. The geographical features of each country are also 
significant as to where the imported gas originates. In Spain, the majority of the imported 
natural gas originates in Algeria (33 %) and Nigeria (20 %), but in Germany the imports are 
mainly from Russia (37 %) and Norway (33 %) (European Commission, 2012). It is important 
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to have these differences in mind when referring to the EU as a large consumer of natural gas, 
because this does not apply to all countries and each country is supplied by a different mix of 
countries. 
The largest consumer of natural gas in the EU in 2010 was the power generation sector, which 
accounted for 32 percent of total use in 2010, closely followed by households (27 %) and 
industry (19 %) (European Commission, 2012). 
3.3 The purpose of liberalisation 
The EU depends largely on energy imports, both of oil and natural gas. The energy 
dependency rate for natural gas was 62, 4 % in 2010 and indicates that EU countries are 
dependent on imports from non member states to sustain today’s level of gas consumption 
(Eurostat, 2012).
7
 Therefore, one of its biggest concerns is the security of the supply of 
energy. A common and consolidated policy is needed to secure international relations 
concerning energy supply deals. One of the EU’s biggest challenges in this concern is the 
relationship with Russia, the largest supplier of fossil fuels, including natural gas, to the 
Union. This will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
The purpose of the Gas Directives is to gradually open up the market to competition in 
acquisition, transmission and sales and move towards a liberalised internal gas market. This 
involves the aim to create internal and external competition based on a competitive unified 
gas market by integrating the suppliers (Finon & Locatelli, 2002, p. 2). The involvement of 
the suppliers is a key issue as this involves several non-member states. 
A report prepared for DG Energy states: “Greater integration of the gas market will likely 
produce important economic benefits from price effects and from increased security of 
supply.” (Booz&Company, et al., 2013, p. 3) Although this is a report ordered by DG Energy 
and one might question the objectivity of the results, it gives a clear indication of the 
Commissions motives concerning the liberalisation process. According to the Commission, 
the liberalisation of the gas market will lead to lower prices for the consumer, both 
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 The energy dependency rate shows the proportion of energy that an economy must import. It is defined as net 
energy imports divided by gross inland energy consumption plus fuel supplied to international maritime bunkers, 
expressed as a percentage. A negative dependency rate indicates a net exporter of energy while a dependency 
rate in excess of 100 % indicates that energy products have been stocked. 
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households and industries, thus increasing European competitiveness globally and ensuring 
security of supply. The objective of increasing European competitiveness can explain why so 
much of the liberalisation process has taken place as a result of Directives mainly concerned 
with competition policy, rather than energy policy.   
3.4 The liberalisation process 
The European Commission’s mission to create an Internal Market for Energy through 
liberalisation of the energy markets within the European Union started 25 years ago. The 
liberalisation of the European gas market must be understood as a continuing process which 
started in 1988 when the Commission decided to include the energy market in the Single 
European Act. Originally the energy sector was not included when the first move towards a 
Single market was made in 1985. European Energy markets were considered to be very 
difficult to change because of strong, national energy policies and monopolies on the import 
side (Matlary, 1990, p. 78). However, the Commission changed its position in 1988 and 
released a Commission Working Document entitled “The Internal energy market”. The first 
objectives were very ambitious with a goal of completing a large internal energy market by 
the end of 1992, by eliminating the obstacles for fully integrating the market. The market is 
still not fully liberalised and it has been an ongoing process since then, brought forward by 
several directives (EU, 1988). 
The purpose of the directives is to create a liberalised market for energy in the EU and 
eventually in all of Europe. The goal is a European single market, not just a single gas market 
reserved for members of the EU (EU, 1998). Part of the explanation for this is of course that 
the gas market includes many actors from outside the EU, mainly the suppliers from Norway, 
Russia and Algeria.  
The priority for the EU has always been adherence to the principles of competition and in the 
external report commissioned by the EEA Review Committee, Austvik and Claes argue that 
the process towards liberalisation of the gas market has been characterised by competition 
policy rather than energy policy (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 14). The directives included in the 
process are all focused on unbundling, securing third party access and other competition 
related issues. They say very little about security of supply and environmental topics, even 
though security of supply is a prioritised area. However, the launch of the Energy 2020 
strategy involves more comprehensive thinking concerning energy policy, including 
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competition, environmental and energy policies. The strategy also included a plan to improve 
coordination among governments to strengthen the EU when negotiating with energy 
suppliers (European Commission, 2011c). 
3.5 “The Internal Energy Market” from 1988 
The Commission working document “The Internal Energy Market” (IEM) released in 1988 
marks the starting point of the liberalisation of the European gas market. (EU, 1988). 
According to this document: 
The biggest barriers to the free movement of gas in Europe are government controls on 
natural gas imports and exports and undertakings holding a monopoly or dominant position 
enabling them to block movements of natural gas. (EU, 1988, p. 63) 
As a result, two areas emerged as priorities: energy prices and infrastructure. The 
liberalisation process was also dependent on the removal of obstacles. The most important 
obstacles were monopolies, cartel-like structures and diverging national legislation and 
technical norms. The proposed solutions for removal of these obstacles were; harmonisation 
of taxation and technical norms, the opening up of public procurement, price transparency and 
unbundling as a way of improving the infrastructure and controlling energy prices (EU, 1988, 
p. 9).  
Differences in national legislation and technical norms formed an obstacle towards the 
creation of an IEM. In accordance with general policy in the EU, the Commission proposed 
harmonisation of all taxes related to natural gas in adherence to the policy of convergence and 
to avoid discrimination based on nationality or type of costumer. For example, this would 
mean a termination of taxes on large industrial consumers that existed in France at the time. 
(EU, 1988, p. 62) There were also several technical barriers hindering the liberalisation and 
this issue was later addressed in a Directive implemented in 1997 (Directive 97/23/EC). The 
directive was developed together with the European gas industry and involved the continued 
work to interconnect the European gas pipeline network to ensure the possibility of expanding 
the market (EU, 1997). Interconnecting the infrastructure for gas was also important to 
achieve full security of supply by securing several points for import. The harmonisation of 
legislation and technical norms was very important to achieve the desired degree of 
convergence between member states. The structures of the gas markets varied from one 
country to another, dependent on geographical features, environmental legislation, degree of 
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import dependency, population density and more. By harmonising the markets Europe moved 
towards a more efficient market for natural gas, a requirement for liberalisation. 
The opening up of public procurement was together with the harmonisation of rules and 
technical norms an essential step towards the removal of technical barriers. Because of the 
importance of energy for industry and households it is a priority for governments to secure 
future access. This explains the reason for heavy state ownership in the energy sector and the 
tight regulative framework in most states. State ownership leads to the national authorities 
being involved in most purchases of energy equipment. It was the Commission’s assumption 
that this led to “national chauvinism”, the discrimination of suppliers and producers based on 
nationality, in all member states. The Single European Act did not apply to energy up until 
1988 and subsequently the EU directives concerning the awarding of public contracts and 
other public procurements did not concern the energy sector. But the muddied processes 
around public procurements regarding energy was considered a clear obstacle towards an IEM 
and a process of opening up public procurements was therefore essential in liberalising the 
energy market (EU, 1988, p. 16). 
The removal of fiscal barriers, specifically the differences in taxation of energy in each 
member state, and the lack of price transparency was also considered to be of tremendous 
importance. It was widely recognised to be one of the major obstacles in realising an IEM and 
became a priority in the Commission’s implementation of the coming Directives (EU, 1988, 
p. 17). 
One of the key elements of the plan for an IEM was stated in the document “The Internal 
Energy Market” from 1988 and isolates monopolies as the major obstacle for liberalising the 
gas market. 
Transport of gas in the Member States is characterized by the existence of statutory or de 
facto monopolies in the market place. (…) The presence of dominant or monopoly 
transmission undertakings in each Member State gives rise to segmentation of the Community 
market; these undertakings can restrict the through transport of gas and even where no 
specific legislation exists, can block the import and export of gas. (EU, 1988, p. 64) 
To achieve an Internal Energy Market by liberalising the existing compartmentalised energy 
market, the removal of the trade practices that prevented the free flow of goods and 
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services from one nation to another was a requirement. In other words, the monopolies had to 
be removed. The proposed solution for this was introducing a so called “Common Carriage”-
system for transmission of gas by the use of unbundling and third party access (TPA) 
(Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 23). TPA involved giving a third party access to the infrastructure 
for transmission of gas that the owner of the network did not own themselves in exchange for 
a tariff payment. This can be compared to paying a toll for driving on a private road. A TPA-
arrangement is only possible in a system where the owner of the pipelines operates solely as a 
transporter, and is not the owner of the transported gas. This involved “a structural separation 
between transmission system operator activities on the one hand, and generation, production 
and supply activities on the other hand” (European Commission, 2013). The purpose of 
unbundling was to ensure the neutral behaviour towards all users of the network and avoid 
conflicts of interest. This resulted in the establishing of TSOs. The Commission was well 
aware of the controversies this would create and the demand for unbundling was not made 
until 1998 in the first Gas directive, where it was stressed that the internal market would be 
established gradually “in order to enable the industry to adjust in a flexible and ordered 
manner to its new environment”. (EU, 1998, p. 1)  
3.6  The directives – a package system 
As stated above, the plan was to establish the internal energy market gradually and therefore 
the EU legislation was composed of a package system consisting of three directives, each 
repealing the previous one. The third and latest package was implemented in the EU 
legislative system in 2007. However, what is known as the Gas directives was preceded by 
three other directives made to clear the way for the coming gas package. This is a presentation 
of the Directives and their contents in order of implementation, resulting in one Gas Directive. 
The transit- and transparency directives are considered to be the first steps towards 
liberalisation of the gas market. The Transparency directive sought to secure energy price 
transparency to counter distortion of the market (EU, 1990). When pursuing the objectives of 
the IEM, the Commission realised that the gas sector’s “special characteristics” needed to be 
addressed by specific Directives. The special characteristics referred mainly to the high-
pressure transmission grids across Europe. The purpose of the Transit directive issued in 1990 
was therefore to improve the EU’s security of supply and reduce costs by allowing the 
transfer of natural gas between grids (EU, 1991). Both directives were approved without 
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controversy by the EU members and fulfilled the objectives of removing technical barriers in 
the process towards an IEM. (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 23) 
Because of the global situation; i.e. the fall of Soviet, the reunification of Germany, the Gulf 
war and the increased environmental focus, the market for natural gas had already started to 
change and the Norwegian government had already adapted its legislation accordingly. 
Therefore, the transit- and transparency directives did not have any direct consequences for 
the Norwegian gas regime. The directives were even considered to have no relevance for the 
Norwegian energy sector and were almost ignored by the authorities (Claes, 2002, p. 21). 
When the road was paved by the Transparency and Transit directives, it was time to roll out 
the Gas Market Directives. The first Gas directive (98/30/EC) was introduced in 1998 and its 
purpose was to create a freer gas market in Europe by establishing the system of TPA and 
unbundling. It set up common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of 
natural gas. This would ease the access to the gas delivery network for producers and buyers, 
including the upstream pipeline network, which also consisted of the Norwegian pipeline 
system. The local distribution networks were not affected in this instance. The continued use 
of take-or-pay contracts (TOP) would be up to each national government to determine (EU, 
1998). 
By reducing the obstacles to free flow between national markets, the idea was that it would 
increase the use of spot exchanges and the build up of so called hubs, marketplaces for 
multilateral exchanges. This in turn would reduce the use of long term contracts by increasing 
the flexibility of the market. The directives took a long time to be approved because of huge 
resistance from the gas industry. This was largely due to the demand for TPA and unbundling. 
The most relevant part of the Gas directive for the Norwegian gas regime is the so called 
“Upstream article”. (EU, 1998, p. 68) It is organised under the chapter concerning third party 
access and implies that TPA must apply to all suppliers, including non-members. This article 
has also been the most controversial among the pipeline-based suppliers, including Norway 
and Russia (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 27). 
The second Gas directive (2003/55/EC) was a part of a package including an electricity 
directive (2003/54/EC) (EU, 2003). Its objective was to increase the functionality of the 
European gas market by continuing the harmonisation of rules and technical norms and 
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provisions towards TPA. The Directive emphasised the role of national regulation and legal 
decoupling in the unbundling progression.  
The third and latest Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) was introduced in 2009 and was also part of 
a package for both natural gas and electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC). It was a result of the 
lack of progress in the liberalisation and repealed the second Directive. This time the focus 
was on ownership decoupling in the process towards unbundling and TPA, meaning that a 
TSO could not be a part of a group involved in the production and sale of natural gas. TSOs 
would need to be certified by the national authorities and reported to the Commission. It also 
established a bureau for cooperation between energy regulators on an EU level named ACER 
(Agency for the Cooperation between Energy Regulators) (EU, 2009). 
“The Europe 2020 initiative – Energy 2020” is the EU strategy aimed to secure “competitive, 
sustainable and secure energy” (EU, 2010, p. 2). It was adopted by the Commission in 2010 
and includes the so called “20-20-20” targets. This strategy involves the following; an aim to 
reduce greenhouse emissions by 20 % within 2020, raising the share of EU energy 
consumption from renewable resources by 20 % and a 20 % improvement in energy 
efficiency. Energy 2020 is an ambitious plan involving many plans and strategies where new 
ones are amended regularly. The five priorities of Energy 2020 are; achieving an energy 
efficient Europe; building a truly pan-European integrated energy market; empowering 
consumers and achieving the highest level of safety and security; extending Europe's 
leadership in energy technology and innovation; strengthening the external dimension of the 
EU energy market (EU, 2010, pp. 5-6).   
The gas sector is specifically mentioned in the strategy and the process of liberalisation is to 
be given continued priority to ensure improved efficiency of the energy market. The need for 
national implementation of the Gas directive is also pointed out as an area that will be given 
special attention by the Commission. This suggests the Commission’s dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the IEM.  Although the Commission recognised the high costs of upgrading the 
energy infrastructure to achieve free flow of natural gas, it was stressed that it was an 
important part of the IEM and of securing future energy supplies. 
Networks outside EU borders were also mentioned and the construction of new 
interconnections in neighbouring countries will receive rigorous EU monitoring. The 
construction of new pipelines establishing new corridors of delivery would be especially 
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prioritized to secure future energy supplies to the EU. This suggests that the adjustments 
concerning the recent gas directives will not be the last adaptations the Norwegian gas regime 
will have to make (EU, 2010, p. 10). 
3.7 Progress 
In 2012 the Commission released a report named “It’s time to complete the internal energy 
market” (European Commission Press Release, 2012). The title alone suggests EU 
unhappiness concerning gas liberalisation. This report followed the publication of a 
Commission staff working document on the progress in creating the internal energy market 
for gas and electricity in 2011 (European Commission, 2011a).  
The report mentions certain progressions for the wholesale market; convergence of prices, a 
certain decrease in prices, better cooperation among power exchanges and TSOs. However, 
obstacles still exists for an IEM, especially in the retail market. The interconnections between 
member states are mentioned as insufficient and an absence of harmonisation of market rules 
in the member states are also significant shortages (EU, 2010, p. 14). 
One of the main obstacles for liberalising the energy market has been the investments needed 
to achieve harmonisation of technical norms in the supply infrastructure. Security of supply 
has been a crucial motivation for liberalisation because a fully integrated market is necessary 
to achieve the highest level of security of supply. To achieve a security of supply situation in 
all 27 member states, investments in the range of 10 – 13 billion Euros is still needed in the 
gas infrastructure towards 2022 (Booz&Company, et al., 2013, p. 3). Additionally, 
commitments due to long term “take-or-pay”-contracts have been obstacles in the 
liberalisation process (Finon & Locatelli, 2002, p. 5).    
The initially mentioned report suggests unhappiness concerning the progress of the IEM and 
in 2011 the EU Heads of State declared the need to complete the internal energy market by 
2014 (European Commission Press Release, 2012). The European Gas market is far from 
liberalised in 2013. But segments of the market have become far more flexible and open, 
resulting in a more liberalised market and progressions towards an IEM (Austvik & Claes, 
2011, p. 13). 
It was the Commission who pushed the liberalisation forward, not the member countries. The 
strong political forces controlling each country’s gas sector had very different opinions on the 
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approach that should be taken towards an internal energy market. While the British favoured a 
market with little governmental supervision, the French was in favour of strong directive 
influence from the state. Matlary describes the situation as tensions between “more market” 
and “more politics” (Matlary, 1990, p. 79). This exemplifies the many obstacles the 
Commission has met on the road towards liberalisation and also explains why this is a process 
that is still ongoing since its beginning in 1988. 
3.8 Chapter conclusion 
Although there have been several challenges facing the realisation of an IEM, the driving 
forces behind the EU liberalisation remains. The purpose of securing the future energy supply 
to the EU and lowering prices for consumers permeates all of the Directives implemented by 
the Commission. So does its resolve to achieve a liberalised gas market in the EU.  
The upstream article in the Gas directive caused much conflict with the suppliers to the 
European market, especially with Norway because of the EEA agreement. The conflict 
originated in a fundamental difference in the view of organising the gas on the supply side  
The intention of removing monopolies by unbundling and introducing TPA to the massive 
European gas infrastructure initiated a process that is not yet completed and is sure to 
progress with varying speed in the years to come.  
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4 The consequences of EU liberalisation in Norway 
The following chapter contains the main analysis of the consequences of the liberalisation of 
the European gas market for the Norwegian gas regime, based on the results from the 
presentations above. To improve the discussion of the main research question, it will also 
include further details of the evolution of Norwegian gas sales. 
By considering the consequences of the liberalisation of the natural gas market in Europe in 
Norway I intend to shed light on the relationship between Norway and the EU in more general 
terms. This is one of many ways to show how the Norwegian society and politics is highly 
influenced by internal political decisions in the EU, despite not being a member. For this 
reason, my main research question is: 
What are the consequences of the liberalisation of the European gas market for the 
Norwegian gas regime? 
In this chapter I will discuss the liberalisation of the EU gas market and its implementation 
through various directives and show how this has affected the Norwegian gas regime. The 
choice of analysing Norway’s relationship with the EU as an organisation as opposed to an 
intergovernmentalist approach, where the most important actors are the individual nation 
states, is grounded in the decisive role of the Commission in the liberalisation process. The 
petroleum sector has been characterised by strong Government regulation, especially in 
France (Gaz de France) and Great Britain (British Gas). Therefore, the liberalisation has been 
conducted with the Commission at the helm, not the member states (Matlary, 1997, pp. 28-
32). 
In the first part of the chapter I will look into the claim that the dissolution of the GFU was a 
direct consequence of the liberalisation. The first hypothesis is: 
Without the pressure from the EU, Norway would have kept the GFU arrangement and long-
term contracts. 
Through an account of the historical development of Norwegian gas sales I will show how 
EU regulations set a regulative framework for its internal market and simultaneously changed 
the conditions for the Norwegian gas regime. The EU created the IEM to secure future energy 
supplies, to reduce prices and improve services for the consumers. In other words, the 
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liberalisation process was tailored for the import countries, but still it affected the export 
countries in many ways. The termination of the GFU is a prime example of how the EU’s 
regulative framework conflicted with the governance of Norwegian authorities. 
The second part of the chapter will concentrate on the study around the following hypothesis:  
The establishing of Gassco and Gassled is a direct consequence of the liberalisation of the 
European gas market. 
Gassco was established the same year as the GFU was terminated. By continuing the 
historical account of the Norwegian gas sales I will confirm or falsify the hypothesis by 
discussing the consequences on EU liberalisation for the Norwegian gas regime. The 
discussion of these hypotheses will provide a response to a major portion of the main research 
question by illustrating the consequences through two relevant examples. 
4.1 Norway’s room for self-determination in the gas industry 
All energy trade between Norway and European countries operate within an EU framework 
established by the directives. The Norwegian room for self-determination in the international 
energy market is controlled by international regulations and legislation. These regulations also 
affect the gas regime operating within Norwegian borders. The Norwegian gas regime is 
under constant influence of competition legislation of the EU and changes in the gas market 
as a result of EU liberalisation.  
The EEA agreement has secured Norwegian citizens and businesses equal opportunities in the 
Internal market through regulations for free movement of goods, capital, labour and services. 
(Claes, 2002, p. 9) The developments within the EU have become a central premise for 
Norwegian policies. The liberalisation of the gas market has altered the Norwegian method of 
governing the gas sector; it has altered the whole gas regime. 
The reorganisation of Norwegian gas sales as a consequence of the liberalisation of the gas 
market includes several changes. I will address what I consider to be the most important; the 
termination of the GFU and the establishment of Gassco. An important underlying theme of 
this discussion will be that the changing framework the Norwegian gas regime has been 
presented with has been brought on by the Union. The EU and the Norwegian government 
have different priorities concerning gas policies and the conflicting interests of the importer 
and the exporter comes up to the surface in the case of the liberalisation of the gas market. 
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The EU liberalisation process has been characterised by strong conflicting interests between 
Norway and the EU. The directives have largely been met by resistance from Norway, 
resulting in threats of legal prosecution from the EU. Norway’s room for self-determination 
seems slim in this case and will be explored in this chapter (Claes, 2002, p. 22).  
4.2 Organisation of Norwegian gas sales 
In their report concerning the EEA agreement and Norwegian energy policy, Austvik and 
Claes provide a chronological review of the organisation of Norwegian gas sales by dividing 
it into four significant periods. The four phases are set before the signing of EEA agreement 
and therefore gives useful background information when evaluating the process leading up to 
the termination of GFU and the establishment of Gassco (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 25). By 
supplying additional historical information I will present a comprehensive overview of the 
changing framework for the Norwegian gas regime. 
The first phase of Norwegian gas sales takes place during the 1970s. Production on the 
Ekofisk field in the North Sea began in 1971 and was the first Norwegian field in production. 
It is a very large field and is expected to be able to produce until 2050 (ConocoPhilips, 2013). 
Gas sales during the first phase came from Ekofisk and the Frigg field. It was sold by the 
license holders through depletion contracts. These contracts are also called output contracts 
and it meant that all production from a specific field was sold to one buyer. In the case of the 
Ekofisk field, it was sold to a purchasing consortium on the European continent. (Austvik & 
Claes, 2011, p. 25) As previously mentioned in chapter 2.1, this was a period when gas sales 
were treated as a purely commercial business and was under minor governmental control.  
When the 1980s arrived the market was changing and the second phase of Norwegian gas 
sales was a seller’s market. Due to an increase in gas demand in Europe, the number of buyers 
rose and subsequently the competition increased. This was good news for the growing gas 
exploration and production on the NCS. The large deposits of natural gas discovered on the 
NCS promised long term supplies of Norwegian gas far in to the future. Global conditions 
also increased the demand for natural gas. The sum of increasing oil prices in the late 1970s, 
uncertainties concerning deliveries from the Middle East, political conflicts concerning 
pipelines between the US and Europe and insecurity related to Soviet gas deliveries led to a 
great interest in Norwegian gas. Gas from the NCS was stable and based on long-term 
contracts. This gave Norway an advantage in negotiations and in 1981 the price of gas from 
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the Statfjord field broke the record when achieving the highest ever paid price for natural gas, 
a so called “price premium”(ibid.). 
Austvik and Claes start the third phase of Norwegian gas sales in 1984. The market changed 
in the favour of the buyer instead of the seller and the industry had to adapt to market value 
principles. Russia (Soviet) and the Netherlands increased their exports and the market shifted 
from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market (Claes, et al., 1990, p. 15). The premier example of the 
changing market is the failed negations concerning the Sleipner-field. It was followed by a 
new type of gas sales, based on volume instead of specific fields (ibid.). In this contract, the 
buyers pushed through a much lower price that would also apply for the Statfjord-deal from 
1981, effectively reducing the “premium price” by twenty percent (Halmø, 2012, p. 17). 
The Troll-contract resulted in a new system and introduced the fourth phase. The Troll 
Commercial Model (TCM) included several smaller supply contracts and allowed the 
production of smaller gas fields that had been evaluated as too small to be profitable. Through 
the TCM the large Troll-field would guarantee the negotiated volume, but a part of the gas 
delivery could originate from other smaller fields. (Claes, 2003, p. 17) This involved a 
complete change in gas sales, from depletion contracts to volume based contracts. Because of 
the large investments needed in the exploration and production of new fields, the TCM 
opened up the possibility expanding the operations on the NCS by securing investments in 
smaller fields (ibid.). 
Statoil showed apparent reluctance towards structural changes in the system of gas exports 
and wanted to keep the system of long term contracts. The company stated that a change in 
the system could hardly benefit any of the actors involved in the gas market. Nevertheless, 
Statoil clearly made preparations towards a change in the market structure by negotiating the 
contract on the Troll-field and constructing Zeepipe, which led to increased flexibility 
towards the market, see figure 1 (Claes, et al., 1990, p. 16).  
Because of declining oil prices, the first part of the decade was characterised by low political 
involvement, the focus was rather on securing revenue. However, with the failed Sleipner-
negotiations the incentive for governmental involvement was strengthened. In 1986 all 
Norwegian gas sales were centralised through the Gas Negotiating Committee (GFU). Before 
this, Statoil had the sole responsibility of negotiating gas contracts. The proposition to 
establish the GFU was presented in the Report to the Storting (St. Meld. Nr 46 (1986-87) and 
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was established when the Norwegian Parliament approved the report. It was stated that the 
main assignment of the GFU was to secure long term conditions for Norwegian gas sales 
(Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 1997). 
The organisation of the GFU was also a reaction to a similar arrangement on the Continent. 
Several gas companies, among them Ruhrgas and Gaz de France, had organised themselves in 
to a buyer’s monopoly where they negotiated gas imports as one entity. The Norwegian 
reaction to this was the GFU. Foreign companies were not allowed to participate in order to 
prevent them from sitting on both sides of the negotiation table and the members were the 
Norwegian petroleum companies at the time; Statoil, Hydro and Saga. Another reason for the 
founding of GFU was to secure a certain price level. It was theorised that competition among 
the sellers on the NCS would drive the prices down, thus reducing the state’s income (Austvik 
& Claes, 2011, p. 13). The increased governmental involvement through the GFU coincide 
with the seventh oil commandment “The state must become involved at all appropriate levels 
and contribute to a coordination of Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry”. (see 
2.5) One of the conditions for the arrangement was that the MPE had to approve each gas 
contract. This stresses the heavy governmental hand in Norwegian gas sales before the 
European Commission’s working paper on an Internal Energy Market in Europe was 
introduced in 1988. The GFU had similarities with the arrangements of the other main 
suppliers to the European gas market; Russia and Algeria, where all gas exports was 
performed by nationalised gas companies, respectively Gazprom and Sonatrach. 
In 1993 an additional agency was established that allowed non-Norwegian companies access 
to negotiations concerning gas sales as an advisory committee, called “Forsyningsutvalget” 
(FU). This was a small reform in itself, as it opened up the possibility that European gas 
companies would sit on both sides of the table, which the establishment of the GFU had 
sought to avoid. The MPE still had the last word and the GFU was continued to be viewed as 
discriminatory by the EU (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 555). 
In 1992 Norway signed the EEA agreement, initiating an extensive legal cooperation with the 
EU. It included Norway in the Single market and obliged Norway to implement parts of EU 
legislation. This meant that the EU as an institution had a new channel for influence in 
Norway and led to several adaptations in Norwegian legislation and state management, 
among them the termination of the GFU in 2001. Previously, the changes in the Norwegian 
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gas sector were a result of variations in the market. The TCM and the initial foundation of the 
GFU were consequences of a changing gas market, not direct requirements by the EU. By 
introducing the first Gas directive in 1998, the EU demanded changes from their suppliers as 
well in addition to the end of gas monopolies in Europe. 
The organisation of Norwegian gas sales went through different phases from its beginning in 
the 1970s and up to the signing of the EEA-agreement. Up until 1992 the changes to the gas 
regime were mainly caused by global and regional changes to the energy market and a 
maturation of the Norwegian petroleum sector. The EEA agreement led to a new channel of 
influence and increased integration of the Norwegian gas regime in to the European gas 
market. 
4.3 Hydrocarbons licensing Directive of 1994 
Although the Hydrocarbons licensing directive (94/22/EC) initially did not change a lot to in 
Norway, it is the first example of how the general EU competitive policies made its way into 
the energy sector, which previously had been used on other principals for making business. 
The Commission promoted the Directive for the first time in 1992 (EU, 1992), and it was 
approved by the Council of Ministers with a few changes in (EU, 1994). The directive was 
grounded in the Rome treaty’s provisions about free competition and intended to secure non-
discriminatory awarding of oil- and gas licenses. As a result, the MPE could no longer award 
licenses based on nationality or to Statoil because of state ownership (Claes, 2003, p. 11). 
This also meant that Statoil could not remain a participant in every license awarded on the 
NCS, as had been the rule up until then. 
The Norwegian government opposed this directive because it changed the system of 
licensing. But it caused controversy neither in the industry nor politically. Most Norwegian 
politicians settled with calling it superfluous and refrained from criticising further (Austvik & 
Claes, 2011, p. 21). From the industry’s point of view the directive could have gone even 
further and reduced the role of the Government even more. The active role of the Norwegian 
authorities in the petroleum sector is clearly exemplified by the MPE’s role in awarding 
licensees on the NCS and Claes and Austvik claim that the industry would have preferred an 
even more liberal direction in the governing of the Norwegian petroleum resources (Austvik 
& Claes, 2011, p. 18).  
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Statoil welcomed the Licensing directive and when taking Statoil’s positive attitude towards 
the Licensing Directive in to account, it may also explain why Norwegian authorities did not 
object more. The Directive did cause changes in the Norwegian model for governing the 
petroleum sector and one would expect protests. When Norwegian officials didn’t protest 
other than calling it superfluous, I will therefore draw a cautious conclusion, when I assume 
that Statoil influenced the Government in this matter and that the relationship between Statoil 
and the State was not as simple as emperor and vassal, but more of a partnership. 
4.4 The dissolution of the GFU 
The dissolution of the GFU involved the liberalisation of the Norwegian gas market and was a 
direct consequence of the liberalisation of the European energy market. It became the most 
extensive conflict between the Norwegian government and the EU and serves well as an 
example of a lack of balance of power between the two parties. The EU applied all measures 
available through the EEA agreement to ensure the full liberalisation of the IEM, including 
the supply side. As mentioned in the introduction I will discuss this by considering the 
following hypothesis: 
Without the pressure from the EU, Norway would have kept the GFU arrangement and long-
term contracts. 
The outcome of a change in gas sales was a shift away from long-term contracts towards more 
flexible contracts, a more competition friendly and liberalised approach concerning gas sales. 
I will begin by giving an account of the dissolution of the GFU and continue with the 
discussion revolving around the hypothesis. A major obstacle towards an Internal Energy 
Market was the monopolies dominating the European gas markets. The package system of gas 
directives sought to unbundle ownership of the transmission systems and secure TPA. The EU 
could not accept a monopoly on the supply side while at the same time removing them within 
its own borders. Therefore, the cartel like structure of the GFU was not accepted by the 
Commission. Through the EEA agreement Norway was obliged to implement EU directives 
relevant to policy areas included in the agreement. The EU threatened Norway with legal 
consequences if the GFU was not terminated with basis in its rights given through the EEA 
agreement. The termination of the GFU would mean that each license holder on the NCS was 
free to market and distribute their own gas production. 
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The German gas company Wingas (a joint venture between Wintershall and Gazprom) tried 
to gain access to the NCS by entering in to cooperation with Norwegian Saga in the early 
1990s, but the deal was stopped by the GFU. The refusal caused the German 
Bundeskartellamt to bring the case forward to the Commission and the GFU’s position as a 
trade barrier became even more obvious from Brussels. This led to the raiding of Statoil, 
Hydro and the MPE by the Commission in 1996 and resulted in two investigations for 
violations of EEA-legislation, respectively article 53 and 59. The investigations were kept on 
hold while the Gas Directives were being implemented (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, 
p. 555). The GFU was temporarily terminated by the Government the 1
st
 of June in 2001 and 
on permanent basis in January 2002. The Commission threatened the Norwegian companies 
with penalties in the range of NOK 50 billion and the threat of legal action and fines seems to 
be the reason for the decision to terminate the GFU (NTB, 2002). In the report to the Storting 
concerning the petroleum sector from 2001, it was argued that the GFU was discontinued due 
to the maturation of the Norwegian gas regime. The transmission and production systems 
were well developed and therefore the need for large investments was reduced. It also claims 
that this was an adaptation to the increased use of short term contracts in the European market 
due to the liberalisation process (Ministry of Petroelum and Energy, 2001-02, p. 70).  
The Commission was not completely satisfied with the discontinuation and a week later it 
sent a statement of objections to Statoil and Hydro, as former members of the GFU, warning 
them of the infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA agreement 
(European Commission Press Release, 2001). This may seem excessive considering the recent 
termination of the GFU, but the Commission was of the opinion that the many long-term 
contracts negotiated by the GFU still had restrictive effects and that the contracts were in fact 
settled on an illegal foundation. This resulted in a prolonged negotiation process and resulted 
in the Norwegian state’s approval of the Gas directive validity on the NCS and Statoil and 
Hydro committed to supply an additional 15 billion Sm
3
 of natural gas to new customers in 
Europe over a four year period (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 556).  
When analysing the hypothesis’ validity, the most important aspect is the channels of EU 
influence. The GFU was part of the Norwegian authorities’ management system for the NCS 
and appeared as an obstacle to trade to the Commission and it chose to apply pressure by the 
legal means provided by the EEA agreement. In the mentioned report to the Storting it is 
however claimed that the discontinuation was a result of the maturity of the NCS and an 
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adaptation to the European market. The Norwegian gas regime was forced to make 
adjustments to the management of gas sales by implementing the TCM when the market 
shifted in the 1980s. The commercial channel of influence was therefore nothing new to the 
Norwegian authorities. But the implementation of the EEA agreement introduced a political 
channel for influence from the European continent and the total consequence would be the 
discontinuation of the GFU.  Considering the fact that the Commission took five years to 
issue a statement of objections after it started the investigation of the Norwegian companies 
and that the GFU-arrangement was terminated in the mean time, it may appear that the reason 
for the discontinuation was mainly influence from the commercial channel rather than the 
political channel. Therefore, the hypothesis does not seem to be valid.  
But this interpretation assumes that pressure from the EU came only through the political 
channel. The implementation of the Gas directive in 1998 came during the five year period of 
the Commission’s investigation of the GFU and applied pressure through the commercial 
channel of influence. Although the liberalisation is not yet completed and the implementation 
of TPA was a lengthy process, the promise of what was to come caused changes in the 
European market which spread to the suppliers, among them Norway. The EU can therefore 
said to be the reason for the liberalisation of the Norwegian gas regime by way of liberalising 
the European gas market and applying pressure through the commercial channel, together 
with the threat of legal action through the political channel. 
The argument is supported by the EEA-review who argues that the reorganisation of the 
Norwegian gas regime would have happened without the EEA-agreement, due to the 
development of infrastructure, market development, the maturation of the petroleum sector 
and what is said to be a global liberal trend (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 548). The 
reorganisation may not have happened in the same way, but a change would have come either 
way.  
There is however the case of the other suppliers to the European market, who does not have a 
similar agreement with the EU, to consider. Both Libya and Algeria have kept their strong 
governmental control of gas sales to the European market, despite the EU liberalisation 
(Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 30). This issue will be analysed further in chapter 5, but stresses 
the importance of the total influence from the two channels on the Norwegian gas regime. 
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When considering the validity of the proposed hypothesis I must take the total influence of 
the EU liberalisation into consideration.  Imagining the European market without some form 
of liberalisation of the energy market would go against the basic idea of the EU and would be 
counterproductive.  The evaluation of the hypothesis is also challenged by the fact that the 
Norwegian government itself claims the dissolution of the GFU was a result of a maturing gas 
sector, not pressure from the EU. By including the influence from the commercial channel as 
pressure from the EU, together with the political pressure, the existence of a massive pressure 
from the EU becomes evident. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the GFU was 
originally meant as a response to commercial forces in the European market in the 1980s. But 
this was before the move towards an IEM and the situation on the Continent was 
characterised by similar arrangements on the buying side. I will therefore make the conclusion 
that the hypothesis holds some validity, because of the lack of termination of similar 
arrangements with the other main suppliers. Nevertheless, the GFU was created during a 
different market situation and may seem old fashioned today. As noted earlier, the 
arrangement displayed some flexibility when it was modified in 1993 by the adding of the 
FU. I therefore find it safe to assume that a modernised version of the GFU probably would 
have been a part of today’s Norwegian gas regime had it not been for EU pressure to 
terminate the arrangement. 
As a final comment, it is worth to note that a large amount of the long term contracts 
negotiated during the GFU arrangement are still in effect and new ones are also being signed. 
Although the amount of gas sold with spot prices and on short term contracts is rising, the 
share sold by long term contracts is still around 80-90 % (Statoil, 2008a).  
4.5 The foundation of Gassco 
The discussion concerning Gassco will show how this was a result of EU liberalisation, both 
directly and in-directly. The Norwegian gas regime was forced to adapt to the gas directives 
because of the EEA agreement. At the same time the liberalisation process caused structural 
changes within Norway’s largest gas buyer, the European gas market, and the Norwegian gas 
regime had to adapt to changing market conditions as well. When analysing the consequences 
of EU liberalisation for the Norwegian gas regime I will make use of the following 
hypothesis: 
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 The establishing of Gassco and Gassled is a direct consequence of the liberalisation of the 
European gas market 
The separation of gas sales and access to infrastructure was brought on by the Gas directives 
through unbundling and TPA. The process of unbundling was already underway on the 
Continent, but the establishment of Gassco was a result of the same process in Norway. The 
same day as the GFU was permanently discontinued, January 1
st
 2002, Gassco took over the 
operatorship of all gas transport from the NCS. Within a year of its initialisation, Gassco 
opened up the infrastructure for third party access and with the termination of the GFU, gas 
sales became the responsibility of each company, resulting in the liberalisation of gas sales 
from the NCS (Gassco, 2013a).  
The neutrality of Gassco was, and still is, important to ensure equal treatment of all users and 
efficient use of the resources on the NCS (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013d). This 
was in compliance with the Gas directive and an important tool to secure the intentions of the 
liberalisation process; to provide customers with lower prices and improved services. 
The validity of the hypothesis is determined by the following statement from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy: “The creation of Gassco complies with the demands of the 
EU concerning the organization of gas transmission to the European gas market, as it appears 
in the Gas market directive” (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013d).8  
The creation of Gassco was a part of an extensive reorganisation of the Norwegian gas 
regime. The term reorganisation is the key in the analysis concerning the consequences for the 
Norwegian gas regime of EU liberalisation. Despite that the Norwegian government had to 
take drastic steps in adapting its gas sales to the Gas Directive, the income from Norwegian 
gas sales remain high and the concentration around Statoil and SDFI on the NCS remains 
high. The effects of the liberalisation can therefore be said to be moderate and the 
reorganisation of the Norwegian gas regime can in some ways be viewed as modernisation 
and a process that probably would have been necessary adaptations to a changing global and 
regional energy market without the influence by the EU through political channels.  
                                                 
 
8
 The author’s translation. Original text: Opprettelsen av Gassco imøtekommer EUs krav til organisering av 
gasstransportvirksomhet i det europeiske gassmarkedet, slik det kommer fram i gassmarkedsdirektivet. 
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4.6 Industry consequences 
So far, I’ve focused my discussion on consequences on the governing of the Norwegian gas 
regime. The production companies are also a vital part of the regime and to illustrate the 
consequences for them I will use the example of the German gas company Wintershall. As a 
result of the licensing directive and the liberalisation process in general the company has 
gained access to the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In 2012 Wintershall exchanged shares with 
Statoil in several oil and gas fields in the North Sea. This made the company one of the 
leading producers in Norway. (Wintershall, 2013) What is significant concerning this 
arrangement is that Wintershall is a subsidiary of BASF, the world’s largest chemical 
company. BASF is a large consumer of natural gas. Wintershall has therefore entered into 
partnerships with both Statoil and Gazprom, to obtain lower prices and easier access to gas 
supplies by entering in to competition with Ruhrgas on the German market, on behalf of its 
owner. According to Jonathan P. Stern, the deal with Gazprom was struck in 1999 after a 
refusal from the production companies in the North Sea. Stern (1999, p. 164) claims the 
refusal came because they declined selling to any other than their traditional customers. 
Considering this was in the years before the Russian deal in 1999, my reasoning attributes this 
to the GFU. As we know, the GFU controlled all gas sales from Norway and when it was 
terminated in 2001, the state’s control over Norwegian exports was reduced and opened up 
the NCS to other actors. According to Claes and Austvik the reason for the GFU’s rejection 
was that such a deal would increase competition in the German market and drive gas prices 
down and thus conflicting with the Norwegian state’s instructions of maximizing profits 
(Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 29). To no one’s surprise, this reinforced the EU’s views of the 
GFU as a cartel and a significant barrier to free trade.  
Subsequently, when the GFU was discontinued, Wintershall eventually gained access to the 
NCS and started a close cooperation with Statoil. This is certainly a result of commercial 
interests and the premier driving force behind this must be considered to be BASF. This is 
therefore a premier example of the consequences for the industry because it shows how the 
liberalisation process have opened up the NCS and allowed partnerships that were not 
possible before 2001 because of governmental control. The intention of an IEM was to lower 
the prices for the consumer by increasing competition and if BASF as a consumer of natural 
gas has succeeded in its mission to achieve lower prices, than the cooperation must be 
considered a success story by the EU. 
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4.7 Norway in the middle 
The development of the gas market indicates that the scales of power seem to have shifted 
from the producer to the consumer’s favour. The EU as a consumer has clearly set the 
conditions for Norwegian gas production and export, unlike the situation with the Statfjord-
negotiations in the 1980’s where gas prices reached an all time high in a seller’s market. 
The shared interests of Norway and EU are stability and long term investments and both 
parties will benefit from a predictable market situation. But how does the liberalisation 
process contribute to this? The conflict between Norway and the EU essentially revolves 
around the price level of natural gas. Norway has common interests with other exporting 
countries like Russia and Algeria concerning the issue of price level. This requires a 
balancing act for Norwegian foreign politics between shared interest with exporting and 
importing countries (Austvik, 2003, p. 239). 
Norwegian gas exports may be seen as being in a squeeze between national dependence and 
external dependence. The titles of several reports concerning Norwegian gas sales reflect 
this.
9
 Politically, Norway indentifies itself with Western countries but when it comes to the 
export economy we have a lot in common with countries that we don’t identify with 
politically. The resulting loneliness for Norway has caused the Norwegian gas regime to be 
organised differently than other suppliers, because all issues concerning EU relations and the 
relationship with other supplying countries must be balanced between conflicting interests. 
This balancing act may help to explain the EU influence in Norway.  
4.8 Chapter conclusion 
The EU liberalisation process has influenced the Norwegian gas regime through two 
channels; the political channel and the commercial channel, but they both represent a 
changing framework that was aimed at the internal European energy market. With the 
ambition to achieve an Internal Energy Market the Commission also changed the way 
Norway as a supplier organised gas sales, despite not being an EU-member. By providing an 
historical narrative of the phases of Norwegian gas sales I have showed how the Norwegian 
                                                 
 
9
 Norwegian Gas: The struggle between government control and market developments by Ulrich Bartsch 
(Bartsch, 1999) and the book Naive Newcomer or shrewd salesman? Norway - a Major Oil and Gas Exporter 
edited by Helge Ole Bergesen and Anne Kristin Sydnes. (Bergesen & Sydnes, 1990) 
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gas regime has changed and matured since its beginning in the 1970s. The foundation of the 
GFU was a reaction to the European market, and so was the dissolution. The difference was 
the forces responsible for the changes. The dissolution of the GFU and the creation of Gassco 
cannot be viewed as isolated events, but rather as consequences of a still ongoing process of 
liberalising the European gas market. 
The main consequence of the EU liberalisation was the liberalisation of gas sales from the 
NCS and reorganisation of governmental involvement. Gas companies are now responsible 
for the sale of their own gas. However, Statoil remains the dominate party and 80-90 % of all 
gas is still sold by long-term contracts (Statoil, 2008c).  
The State’s control over the gas sector was altered as a consequence of EU liberalisation. The 
Norwegian tradition for strong governmental control is a contrast to the liberal ideology of the 
EU, but they are both rooted in economic motivation. And one can safely conclude that the 
Norwegian provisions taken as a response to the changing EU framework, did not have any 
negative consequences for the income of the Norwegian state. At least not yet. 
The political consensus in Norway is that energy supplies are not a political commodity, as 
opposed to the position of the Russian authorities who operate with ulterior motives in 
addition to that of financial gain (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 547). This causes 
Norwegian solitude in the European gas market. Because of differing commercial interests 
with the EU, due to the role as exporter versus the EU’s role as importer, and diverging 
political interests with other suppliers like Russia, Norway’s organisation of gas sales is 
unique. 
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5 Comparison 
Norway and Russia are the largest suppliers of natural gas to the EU market. Each country is 
responsible for around a third of the total gas consumption within the EU and together they 
form a battery of natural gas energising Europe. Russia is the biggest supplier to the whole 
European market (including countries outside the EU) and the export of natural gas is 
essential to the Russian economy. As a result, the EU liberalisation process has had 
consequences for the Russian gas regime. This chapter will determine that the Russian and the 
Norwegian gas sector are both influenced by the EU liberalisation, but because of the 
difference in legal cooperation the results are not the same. The consequences are more 
similar when evaluating the consequences of economic integration. 
The comparison with Russia is intended as a method of measuring the influence EU 
liberalisation in Norway. By comparing two states in a similar situation in their role opposite 
the EU, but with different forms of cooperation, I will be able to determine the reason for the 
reorganisation of the Norwegian gas regime. Through the analysis of the political channel and 
the commercial channel for EU influence, I can also clarify which of the consequences in 
Norway are caused by the EEA agreement and which ones are results of market influence by 
observing the lack of a similar consequence in Russia. 
The first part of this chapter includes a presentation of the Russian regime for gas export and 
answers the question of the consequences for Russia, the largest supplier of natural gas to 
Europe, from the liberalisation of the European gas market. The second part is a comparison 
of the consequences for the Russian and Norwegian gas regime based on the following 
question:  What are the similarities and differences between the Russian and Norwegian gas 
regime and why have they been affected differently by the gas market liberalisation? Russia 
and Norway share many similar interests as large suppliers to the EU gas market, but the lack 
of a Russian equivalent to the EEA agreement has kept the control of Russian gas exports in 
the firm hands of the Kremlin, unlike in Norway where gas sales were liberalised with the 
dissolution of the GFU. Nevertheless, Russia has not remained unaffected by the 
implementation of the Gas directive and has been forced to make adjustments to its gas 
regime as a consequence of changing market conditions inside its primary market. 
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5.1 The Russian gas giant 
Russia is a key player in the global energy economy. It has enormous reserves of oil and 
natural gas and in 2010 Russia was the largest producer of oil and natural gas in the world. 
Additionally it was the fourth largest consumer of energy (International Energy Agency, 
2011b, p. 246). Russia was the main exporter of crude oil, natural gas and hard coal to the EU 
in 2010, making up around 30 percent in each category (European Commission, 2012, p. 15). 
Norway is nearly dwarfed in the global comparison, but when one compares the two as 
exporters of natural gas to the European market, the levels are more equal. Russia and 
Norway each supplied the EU with around a third of the total natural gas consumption in 
2012, see figure 3 in subchapter 3.2 (Eurostat, 2012). 
The Russian gas regime is made up of Gazprom. Gazprom controls all exports of natural gas 
from Russia and the majority shareholder in Gazprom is the Russian state. The company 
holds a monopoly on exports of Russian gas, according to Russian Federal Law on Gas 
Export adopted in 2006. The company bases its exports on a long-term contract system under 
the take-or-pay principle, securing a predictable basis when planning future production 
(Gazprom, 2013c).
10
 Gazprom is in reality the Gazprom Group with multiple subsidiaries and 
partners spread out over a wide spectrum of responsibilities concerning gas; banking, 
production, exploration, and pipeline construction, to mention a few. Gazexport is the 
responsible subsidiary concerning export to Europe (Gazprom, 2013a). For the sake of 
simplicity the company will only be referred to as Gazprom. Through this extensive system 
Gazprom holds a firm grip on all exports of natural gas with the Russian authorities governing 
all aspects of its export strategy.  
A process of reforming and restructuring the Russian gas regime began in 2005. The 
relationship of the Russian state and Gazprom has not been conflict free through the years. In 
2003 the Russian government’s share in the company was 38,375, but by 2011 the state had 
taken control over the share majority (50, 002%), effectively reducing the conflict level by 
putting its foot down (Gazprom, 2011). In the late 1990s the government passed legislation 
                                                 
 
10
 Take-or-pay contract is a Buyer-seller agreement where the buyer's obligation to pay is unconditional whether 
or not the purchased goods or services are delivered or taken. Such arrangements are often used as 
indirect guaranties for project financing, and protect the buyers from price increases and the sellers from price 
decreases. (Business Disctionary, 2013b) 
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limiting foreign ownership and president Putin’s influence over the company was increased 
when he placed known sympathisers in the Gazprom management committee. (Houlleberghs 
& Zaslavsky, 2004, p. 78) In total, this means that the Kremlin controls all Russian gas 
exports.  
Third party access for Gazprom’s gas network was established in 1998, around the same time 
as the first Gas directive in the EU. This liberalising step was not followed by price 
transparency and accusations on overcharging on tariffs soon emerged from other gas 
companies. The small degree of liberalisation only applied to the market within Russia and 
did not have any effect on Russian exports. Statements made by president Putin in 2003 also 
contributed in reducing the Commissions hopes for future access to the Russian pipelines 
when he declared that the State intended to maintain its control over the gas pipeline system 
and Gazprom (Stern, 2005, pp. 170-172, 181-185). What is certain, is that as a major 
shareholder the Russian government has large influence over the company and the Kremlin’s 
grip on Gazprom remains tight, despite EU encouragement towards liberalising exports.  
The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in the winter of 2009 was the most serious of a long series 
of conflicts between the Ukraine and Russia mainly concerning lack of payment. Russian 
exports to Ukraine were cut off January 1
st
 2009. This led to a humanitarian emergency in 
some of the Balkan countries and several other EU members were seriously affected because 
Ukraine serves as an important entry into the European market for Russian gas. The 
reputations of Russia as a stable supplier and Ukraine as a transit country were severely 
damaged. For the EU it actualised the issue of security of supply and intensified the work on 
building additional entry points to the EU (Pirani, et al., 2009, p. 4). Among them was the 
South Stream, a part of a larger project named South Corridor. The project involves major 
pipeline developments in both Europe and Russia and will be completed by the end 2019. The 
construction of the South Stream pipeline will ensure supply to South-Eastern Europe and 
will follow this route: Russia – Bulgaria – Serbia – Hungary – Slovenia – Italy. By laying the 
pipeline in the Black Sea, it effectively avoids transit countries, like the Ukraine (Gazprom, 
2013d). See figure 4 for details. 
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Figure 4 Major Russian pipelines to Europe (Bailey, 2009) 
 
5.2 Russian gas reserves 
Russian gas production has some differences to the Norwegian. Most of the Russian gas fields 
are found onshore, unlike Norwegian gas reserves found offshore. The majority of Russian 
gas fields are found in remote areas like Western Siberia (78 %) and most of them were 
discovered in the 1960s. This was followed by the discovery of large fields on the Yamal 
peninsula in the 1970s. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 many gas fields were 
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lost to the Russians, but it remained in control of enormous reserves (Stern, 1999, p. 143). 
The production and transmission requires enormous investments and explains the Russian 
preference for long time contracts and take-or-pay clauses.  
Gazprom owns 70 percent of proven Russian reserves as of 2013 and by the end of 2010 the 
reserves were estimated to 35 143,5 billion Sm
3
 of gas (Gazprom, 2013b). Compared to this, 
the 3324,6 billion Sm3 of proven gas reserves on the NCS become almost small (Norwegian 
Petroelum Directorate, 2010). Nevertheless, the amount of gas exports to Europe from 
Norway and Russia is almost equal, despite the difference in reserves. The reason for this is 
the very low gas consumption in Norway and the correspondingly high domestic consumption 
in Russia, along with high production costs in all Russian gas fields. 
During the Soviet period there was a significant difference in export strategy between the 
states in Western Europe and the Soviet Union’s allies (Comecon). Gas sales to Comecon 
countries could be compared to internal trade while trade with Western Europe was 
characterised by traditional exports involving hard currencies. In the 1970s Soviet gas was 
exported to Austria, West Germany, Finland and Italy and the export expanded through the 
1980s with construction of additional supply pipelines. The contracts with the Western 
European countries differed from other contracts of that era, because it did not specify a 
source of the gas (Stern, 1999, pp. 149-152). As we know, Norwegian gas contracts from the 
same era were depletion contracts based on the sale of specific fields rather than volume 
contracts, introduced after the Troll-arrangement.  
5.3 Basis for EU influence 
To be able to compare the consequences of EU liberalisation in Norway and Russia I must 
consider the possible channels of cooperation and influence between the EU and Russia. In 
the case of Norway, this is the EEA agreement and the economic ties between the exporters 
from the NCS and the importers in Europe. Russia does not have an arrangement comparable 
to the EEA agreement and I will assess the possibilities the EU holds for impact on the 
Russian gas regime, in other words; Gazprom. The EU’s possibility for impact over the 
Russian gas regime goes mainly through three channels; the legal cooperation called the 
PCA-agreement, the strategic alliances between Gazprom and several EU based gas 
companies and the contracts between Gazprom and the buyers. 
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The backdrop of politics concerning other areas than energy exports also influence the EU-
Russian relationship. The Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 “cast a shadow 
over the EU-Russia relationship”, spoken by the Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighbourhood Policy (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008). A few years earlier it was Russia’s 
negotiations for WTO membership that created the setting for discussions between EU and 
Russia (Stern, 2005, p. 185). As a major exporter of other energy commodities, the total 
negotiation power of Russia is extensive. The reason for including this is to illustrate that the 
gas trade does not operate within a vacuum; there are more often than not, other things at 
stake as well. In my assessment herein lies one of the major differences between Russia and 
Norway. While Russia does not seem to shy away from using gas exports as political leverage 
when needed, Norway chooses to view gas exports purely as a source of income for the state. 
Considering that Norway has lost its “battles” with the EU time and again, like the EU 
demand for termination of the GFU, it may also be a realisation of its own limits. The 
geographical extent and large population of Russia makes it a more equal opponent for the 
EU in terms of size and may be a part of the explanation for the differences in EU compliance 
in Norway and Russia.  
The current basis for legal cooperation is the 1994 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA) (EU, 2013b). The agreement has been renewed annually until a new one will be 
finalised. The negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement were launched in 2008, but have 
not yet reached an agreement (EU, 2013a). The EU’s ambitions concerning the cooperation 
with Russia are to build a partnership based on transparency, reciprocity and non-
discrimination. In other words, it wants Russia to accept the gas directives (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2008). The possibility of a similar arrangement as the EEA agreement was also discussed at 
one point, but among other issues, the upstream article in the Gas directive could not be 
accepted by Russia (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 27). EU officials have also tended to stress the 
interdependence of Russia and Europe when the issue of liberalisation has been discussed, as 
if to remind the Russians that they are not the only ones laying down the terms of cooperation 
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2008). 
The EU and Russia have also developed a so called strategic partnership, but because of 
frequent disagreements the concept is said to have little content. The main cooperation 
between EU states and Russia happens by trade and neither the PCA nor the strategic 
partnership seems to have yielded substantial results (Moshes, 2012). This does not mean that 
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the PCA has been meaningless, in other areas it may have been an efficient basis for 
cooperation. In the gas sector however, it failed to provide the EU with much influence in 
Russia. 
Considering the debatable results of the PCA, the main reason for EU influence in Russia is 
probably Gazprom’s gas-related investments in Europe. Gazprom is heavily involved in the 
European gas sector in other roles than as a supplier. Through joint ventures with several 
European gas companies, like Wintershall, Gazprom has established partnerships across 
several European countries (16 countries in 1999), mainly revolving around pipeline 
construction and marketing (Stern, 1999, p. 167). These partnerships are the main channel for 
EU influence in the Russian gas sector. When the partners are forced to adapt to EU 
liberalisation, Gazprom will be affected by the changes as well. Among some of these deals, 
is the cooperation with the Dutch company Gasunie, involving storage and other “hub 
services” of Russian gas in the Netherlands (Stern, 1999, p. 179). 
The interdependence of Russia and the EU becomes clearer when considering the economic 
ties rather than the political cooperation. The many joint ventures of Gazprom are not only 
conducted on European soil, many involve heavy investments by European companies in the 
construction of pipelines or direct participation in production operations (European 
Commission, 2011b, p. 3). 
Russia benefits from the EU liberalisation, but refuses liberalisation of its own gas regime. 
Simultaneously it uses gas as leverage (Bilgin, 2011, p. 126). Gazprom’s export monopoly 
involves the negotiation of contracts with individual companies and countries, and the sales 
process is similar to that of Norwegian gas. Except, all Russian gas sales are controlled by the 
state through long term contracts with take-or-pay clauses and state-regulated prices. The sale 
of gas from the NCS is conducted by several companies, but Gazprom is the sole provider of 
gas from Russia. This involves little or no negotiations concerning gas sales with the EU as an 
institution. 
5.4 The consequences of EU liberalisation for Russia 
The state is the most important factor in Russian gas policies. In opposition to the EU which 
wants a liberalised energy market dominated by private companies (Austvik & Claes, 2011, p. 
16 & 27). What are the consequences for Russia, the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe, 
of the liberalisation of the European gas market? 
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The latest meeting between EU and Russia provided little progress to the legal framework of 
cooperation and was attributed to Russia’s unwillingness to commit to EU liberalisation of the 
gas market and other EU “values” (Canay, 2008, p. 30). Subsequently, the channel for legal 
cooperation has not yet proven to be a source of EU influence in Russia. I will therefore 
revolve my focus around the economic ties between Russia and the EU when analysing the 
consequences of the liberalisation of the European gas market in Russia. 
Gazprom favours long term contracts, while the EU wants more short term, flexible solutions 
according to the liberal ideology. Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and third biggest 
trading partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large percentage of its 
exports to Europe. The European Commission’s purpose of liberalising the gas market was to 
achieve lower prices for consumers by opening up the market. The situation where 
monopolies disappeared in favour of unbundling and TPA, also meant new conditions for 
Russian gas exports. The EU did not possess the same legal instruments concerning Russia as 
in Norway, but Russia and Gazprom were affected by the changing market conditions, both as 
an exporter and through strategic alliances.  
The liberalisation of the gas market made it easier for the consumers to change supplier. The 
liberalisation process also encouraged developments of the gas infrastructure, like the 
building of the NETRA pipeline. NETRA connected the supply point in Dornum to Berlin, 
consequently opening up for Norwegian gas in Eastern Germany in 1995 (Open Grid Europe, 
2013a). The potential of supply diversification occurred in several countries as a result of the 
liberalisation process and caused multiple countries to bargain more favourable terms from 
Gazprom, exemplified by NETRA (Stern, 1999, p. 186). Stern also claims that Gazprom 
officials accepted the liberalisation as inevitable, a wording that indicate the Russians were 
not pleased with this development, but realised they needed to adapt to the changing system. 
The increasing competition in the European market forced Gazprom to amplify its emphasis 
on the East Asian markets and in Turkey.  
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Several articles concerning Russian gas exports to the European gas market bear titles 
referring to the interdependence of the two actors.
11
 By underlining the point of 
interdependence they also comment on a vital issue for the Russian gas regime: the pipelines. 
As noted, the development of production and export of natural gas is extremely capital 
intensive, largely due to the construction of thousands of kilometers of pipelines needed to 
reach the gas costumer. It is this system of a fixed connection between seller and buyer that 
makes the suppliers so sensitive to changes made by the buyer. This is true for all the major 
suppliers to the EU market; Russia, Norway and Algeria, who have an extensive pipeline 
system connecting them with Europe. 
As noted in subchapter 3.2, the fourth largest supplier to the EU is Qatar. This is not delivered 
by pipelines, but as liquid natural gas (LNG) transported by ships. The supply chain is 
designed for exporting over great distances and does not have a fixed delivery point like 
supplies through pipelines. This clarifies two issues; firstly, how the proposed 
interdependence between the Russian and Norwegian suppliers and the EU market works. 
Secondly, it shows why the EU as an importer can change the conditions for Norway and 
Russia as exporters. When considering this issue it becomes clear that the EU directives 
designed to address internal issues of cartel-like structures and buying monopolies also 
affected the suppliers of natural gas. Thus, the importer changed the conditions for the 
exporter and forced change also outside its apparent jurisdiction. 
Gas-to-gas competition in Europe is rising as a consequence of EU liberalisation. A report 
published in 2002 predicted that Russian competitiveness would be reduced in the European 
markets due to rising cost levels in production compared with those of other gas exporters. It 
was suspected that costs would rise because of less favourable conditions in the coming years 
on account of depreciation of current fields and more difficult technical conditions in new 
fields (Finon & Locatelli, 2002, p. 9). The development of the Yamal “megaproject”, a not yet 
completed project connecting the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia with Germany, the 
Nord Stream and the South Stream are only some of the obviously large expenditures for 
Gazprom. However, statistics from the Commission show that the gas price for households in 
                                                 
 
11
 E.g.: Russian and European gas interdependence. Can market forces balance out geopolitics? by Dominique 
Finon and Catherine Locatelli (2008) and Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence 
by Christophe-Alexandre Paillard (2010) 
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Germany in 2011 was among the highest in the EU (€ 10,49), despite it being a market of gas-
to-gas competition. At the same time, in Bulgaria all gas imports come from Russia and are 
mostly based on long-term contracts, and has a much lower price for natural gas. (€ 4,61) But, 
the prices alone do not tell us much unless one considers the development. In Germany the 
prices fell from 2005 to 2011, while in Bulgaria they rose quite sharply in the same period 
(European Commission, 2012, pp. 34, 59-60, 72). My reasoning is therefore the following; 
the development of new pipelines has kept Russian gas competitive and the need for 
constructing new transportation channels in to Europe was partly a consequence of EU 
liberalisation. In Bulgaria, Russia is the sole supplier and can probably steer terms in their 
own favour, as seen in the negotiations concerning the South Stream pipelines (see chapter 
5.4). In Germany however, there is more competition and Russia has to operate in a different 
market. Considering the prices went down and the large expenditures concerning pipeline 
development, the income from the German markets were probably reduced. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) claims that all Russian energy sectors are highly ineffective and needs 
to improve its efficiency (International Energy Agency, 2011b, p. 245). Therefore, Russian 
gas reforms aimed at the internal market may be a necessary measure to secure Russian 
competitiveness on the EU gas market and an indirect consequence of EU liberalisation. 
To summarize, the most influential channel in Russia has been the market. As mentioned, 
Russia and the EU are in a state of interdependence. The liberalisation of the European gas 
market made Gazprom adjust their increasing downstream activities in Europe and the 
Russians saw the need to coordinate the upstream sector accordingly. The Energy 2020 
strategy intends to create a more cohesive energy policy and increased coordination between 
EU member states (Energy 2020). If this is successful, the import countries in Europe will 
gain leverage when negotiating gas deliveries and Gazprom may have to adjust as a result of a 
changing legal framework as well. 
5.5 A comparison 
In this comparison I ask the following question: What are the similarities and differences 
between the Russian and Norwegian gas regime and why have they been affected differently 
by the gas market liberalisation? By comparing three factors of each gas regime it becomes 
clear how the differences in the framework for legal cooperation have caused different effects 
of EU liberalisation. In Norway, the EEA agreement gave the EU a stronger basis for 
applying pressure on the Norwegian export management and modifying it in a preferred 
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direction. While the lack of a Russian equivalent has allowed the Kremlin and Gazprom to 
decide the organisation of gas exports without considering future legal retributions from the 
Commission. The three areas of comparison are the following; the pipelines, governmental 
control and market influence. Finally I will address the differences in the political relationship 
of Norway and the EU and the one between Russia and the EU. 
The system of gas delivery by high pressure pipelines is costly to construct, but a cost 
efficient method for delivery. In contrast with the ships required for LNG transport, which is a 
lot more expensive form of transport. On the other hand, the pipelines create an increased 
degree of interdependence, as the geographical position of a potential client is less flexible. 
To keep their competitiveness in an increasingly liberalised and competitive European 
market, both Russia and Norway were forced to adapt their respective gas infrastructure. 
Norway allowed TPA and unbundled the pipelines by establishing Gassco, thus increasing 
efficiency and delivery capacity. Russia’s response to the changing market was to increase the 
number of entry points for Russian gas in to the European market by constructing and 
developing more pipelines; Nord Stream, South Stream and Yamal. This increased delivery 
capacity was also a move to increase the reputation of Russian gas after the Russian-
Ukrainian gas conflict in 2009, by avoiding Ukraine as a transit country. 
 
By viewing TPA and unbundling as a central tool for increased competition it becomes clear 
that the consequences for Russia and Norway differ greatly when it comes to upstream 
activity. In Russia Gazprom is the only exporter of Russian gas. The situation is quite 
different concerning gas from the NCS. Statoil is still the largest exporter of Norwegian gas, 
but it does not hold a monopoly, after the termination of the GFU and foundation of Gassco. 
Russia still uses long-term contracts, while Norway had to reduce this practice. When Norway 
dissolved the GFU and liberalised gas sales, Russian gas exports remained in the firm hand of 
the government through Gazprom. However, the global rise in use of shale gas and LNG has 
shifted the market towards more short term contracts for Russia as well. Shale gas and LNG 
do not rely on pipelines for transportation and is a more flexible commodity. As a 
consequence, both Norway and Russia has developed a growing LNG industry. Among them 
is the development of the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, a joint venture between 
Gazprom (51 %), the French gas company Total (25 %) and Statoil (24 %) (Gazprom, 2013e). 
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The most obvious difference is the organisation of transmission and sales from Norway and 
Russia, the monopoly of Gazprom is contrasted by the more liberalised NCS. But when we 
consider the historical development, the organisation of gas sales was more similar. Before 
the termination of the GFU all gas sales from the NCS were under strong supervision by the 
authorities, similarly with Gazprom’s current role. As an effect of the liberalisation process 
the GFU caught the eye of the Commission as a cartel-like organization and the arrangement 
could not continue while the monopolies and buyer consortiums on the Continent were 
dissolved. By using the legal tools placed by the EEA-agreement the EU altered the 
management of Norwegian gas sales and the GFU was terminated. Unlike in Russia, where 
Gazprom remains the only exporter from Russia and the government has even tightened its 
grip on the company by ceasing the majority shareholding. The Kremlin is consistently 
refusing the upstream article of the Gas Directive and other factors concerning the 
liberalisation process. And because of the apparent ineffectiveness of the PCA agreement and 
the unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a new one, the EU seems to be getting nowhere 
concerning liberalising it largest gas supplier. This shows the major influence of the EEA 
agreement in Norway and demonstrates how the Norwegian gas regime has adapted because 
of it, as opposed to Russian gas exports, which has remained under the control of the Russian 
government. 
When comparing the two largest suppliers of natural gas to the European market, two issues 
become clear; the two countries are in gas-to-gas competition with each other in certain areas 
of Europe and they faced similar challenges concerning market development caused by EU 
liberalisation. The EU liberalisation had little effect on the Russian export management, due 
to lack of adequate legal cooperation. Nonetheless, Russia has not remained unaffected by the 
process and the reason for this is the general market development in the EU. As noted in 
chapter 4.6, the consequences of having to adapt to the License Directive and the Gas 
directive in Norway was increased involvement from foreign gas companies on the NCS. To 
ensure optimal production on the NCS by allowing investments based on non-discriminatory 
allocations from the MPE would increase competitiveness in the EU markets. Similarly in 
Russia, Gazprom was dependent on enormous investments in both the production and the 
transmission sectors and joined in partnerships with many European gas companies to secure 
its position in Europe. Therefore, the effects brought on by changes in the market due to EU 
liberalisation were fairly similar in Norway and in Russia.  
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The liberalisation of the EU market has highlighted Norway’s awkward political and 
economic position as an export country and as a political partner, as discussed in chapter 4.7. 
Norway shares the interest of maximizing profits from gas production with Russia. This does 
not easily line up with the EU liberalisation’s intentions of benefitting the consumers by 
lowering prices. In the long term both the suppliers and the buyers will benefit from operating 
within a predictable framework and the tight legal and political bonds between Norway and 
the EU were reflected on to the liberalisation process. Russia however, does not identify 
politically and culturally with the EU, resulting in a more difficult political cooperation and 
more conflicts concerning gas supplies. 
Additionally, there is a difference concernig other issues impacting bilateral relations. Russia 
uses their gas supply as leverage towards other states and the EU. One of Russia’s largest 
projects is the development of South Stream, a pipeline through the Black Sea to Bulgaria. 
The intention of this pipeline is to tie the European gas market closer to the Russian supply 
and avoid transit countries such as Ukraine. In association with this project Russia has clearly 
stated that as long as the Bulgarian government does not commit fully to the costs of the 
project, they will pay the highest gas prices in Europe (Sherr, 2012, p. 20). This example 
illustrates very clearly how Russia uses their gas supply politically, unlike the Norwegian 
government who has no intention of using Norwegian gas as leverage towards import 
countries (The EEA-review Committee, 2012, p. 547). The Russian inclination to use natural 
gas as an element in power politics has been a part of a strategy to establish a position of 
power in the world and gain an equal position to the EU and the US (Van Der Meulen, 2009, 
p. 846). This may help to explain the reason for the different degree of EU liberalisation in the 
Norwegian and Russian gas regimes. According to the ten oil commandments, the Norwegian 
objective of petroleum exports is to maximize profits. One can safely assume that the Russian 
economic objective is identical. But by adding another layer to Russian gas strategy, namely 
gaining political power by using energy as a key element in global power politics, the 
resistance towards EU liberalisation within the Russian sphere of interest is explained. 
Whereas Norway does not have the similar desire for power and therefore, EU liberalisation 
is more easily absorbed in to the Norwegian gas regime. 
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5.6 Chapter conclusion 
The shared interests of Norway and Russia are securing the future demand for natural gas and 
reaching a high price for gas exports without pricing themselves out of the market. Both gas 
regimes are influenced by the EU liberalisation, but Norway more so than Russia. This can be 
attributed to the EEA agreement and Russia’s more ambitious goals for itself on the global 
scene. The role of the state remains significant in Norway after the implementation of the Gas 
directive, but it has been reduced. In Russia the Kremlin has increased its grip over Gazprom 
and controls every aspect of its export strategy. The increased competition in the European 
gas market has had similar effects in both countries. Therefore the EEA agreement emerges as 
the most important reason for EU influence in Norway as a result of the comparison with 
Russia.  
65 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
The former Norwegian foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, noted in his book from 2008 that 
during his ten years as prime minister, Tony Blair never visited Norway. Despite the fact that 
gas from the NCS accounted for one third of British consumption (Støre, 2008, p. 140). One 
would think that Norway’s importance as a supplier would lead to a visit from the British 
leader, but it seems he did not have any reasons for visiting during his elected period. This 
highlights the fact that the importers interests differ from that of the exporter. For the 
importer, security of supply is the most crucial, but for the exporter it is maximizing profits 
(Matlary, 1997, p. 25). The explanation for Blair’s lack of visits may therefore be the lack of 
problems concerning the Norwegian gas supply. Gassco’s numbers from 2012 show a 
regularity of 99,69 %, a number which has remained stable throughout the years (Gassco, 
2013b). Still, this issue raises the question if there is a significant difference in the way the 
Norwegian gas regime and the way the EU regards Norway’s role a gas exporter. 
The topic of the thesis is energy policy, more specifically gas policies, in Norway and the EU. 
Natural gas is the fastest growing source of energy in the world today. (International Energy 
Agency, 2011a) The revenue from oil- and gas production and export has become a vital part 
of the Norwegian economy and the future income from natural gas is proposed to grow 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013c). As mentioned in chapter 2.7, future growth in gas 
sales is debated, but Norway’s income will probably remain high in many years to come 
regardless of the debate. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that the framework of Norwegian gas exports has been 
altered by the process towards an IEM. However, the income from gas exports has continued 
to rise and Norwegian gas policy of maximizing the profit from petroleum exports does not 
seem to have been affected. 
6.1 Conclusion of main research question 
 The structure of the Norwegian gas regime is the result of more than fifty years of evolution 
of the European market. The Norwegian gas regime has coexisted with the EU market since 
day one, and has been dependent on the European market since the beginning. Therefore, the 
Norwegian gas regime of 2013 is a result of both national and European influence.  
The Norwegian gas regime has undergone many changes since its’ meagre beginnings in the 
1960s. The aim of Norwegian authorities has been to maximise the outcome of the petroleum 
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sector which has been the argument for a heavy hand in governmental control. However, the 
development of the Internal Energy Market in Europe has had extensive consequences for the 
Norwegian gas regime and the framework of governmental management has changed. When 
facing a changing framework, several parts of the regime had to changed, prominently the 
discontinuation of GFU and the establishment of Gassco. In chapter four the commercial 
channel is given the same responsibility for the reorganisation of the Norwegian gas regime. 
But in chapter five, when comparing Norway and Russia, the EEA agreement seems to be the 
only reason for heavy EU influence in Norway. By adding the Russian pursuit of increased 
global power, and the obvious absence of a Norwegian equivalent, the situation becomes 
more nuanced. It becomes apparent that the reason for less political EU involvement in Russia 
may not be caused by the lack of an EEA-type agreement alone. I therefore conclude that the 
consequence of EU liberalisation for the Norwegian gas regime has been a reorganisation of 
export management, caused by a combination of EU influence through political and 
commercial channels. The liberalisation has not had any negative consequences for the 
income from gas sales and not affected Norwegian political goals of maximising profits for 
the good of the society.  
6.2 Conclusion on the relationship between Norway and EU 
How does the research question illustrate the general relationship? In 2012 the EEA Review 
Committee concluded in its final report “Outside and inside” that the Norwegian model for 
relations with the EU is “association without codetermination” (The EEA-review Committee, 
2012, p. 838). As stated in the introduction: the purpose of this thesis is to determine that the 
EU as an importer of natural gas changes the conditions for Norway as an exporter. By 
showing what the consequences for the Norwegian gas regime have been, I can establish that 
the EU definitively changed the conditions in Norway, and this happened without giving the 
Norwegian authorities a chance to influence the people making the decisions in Brussels, 
because of the Norwegian opt-out of codetermination. 
The liberalisation of the European gas market has led to a more liberalised Norwegian gas 
regime. By the partial privatisation of Statoil, the foundation of Gassco and the dissolution of 
GFU the Norwegian gas regime has clearly adapted to a more liberalised market. The exporter 
has adapted to the importer and makes the case of how dependent the Norwegian gas regime 
is the European gas market. In the case of the Norwegian adaptation of the Gas directives, it 
clearly shows how the Norwegian gas sector was forced to modify the export management 
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and therefore serves as a prime example of the potential consequences of the EEA-agreement. 
In the comparison with the consequence in Russia the effects become even more obvious. In 
total it shows the amount of EU influence present in Norway, for both the industry and the 
government, and that the development of the EU deserves and requires great attention from 
Norwegian authorities. 
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8 Appendices 
Appendix A  Exports of natural gas from the NCS in 2012 
Country and recieving terminal Total % 
France - Dunkerque Terminal 14,5 % 
United Kingdom - Easington Terminal 15,7 % 
United Kingdom - Other Terminals 9,2 % 
Germany - Europipe 1 Terminal 18,3 % 
Germany - Europipe 2 Terminal 18,9 % 
Germany - Norsea Gas Terminal 6,7 % 
Denmark - Nybro 0,5 % 
Belgium - Zeebrügge Terminal 12,0 % 
LNG 4,1 % 
Source: (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013c) 
  
82 
 
 
Appendix B  Gasseld’s Owners 
 
Gassled’s owners (as of November 2012) Share (%) 
Petoro AS* 45.793% 
 Solveig Gas Norway AS 24.756% 
 Njord Gas Infrastructure AS  8.036%  
 Silex Gas Norway AS  6.102% 
 Infragas Norway AS  5.006%  
 Statoil Petroleum AS    5.000% 
 Norsea Gas AS  2.261%  
 ConocoPhillips Scandinavia AS    1.678%  
 DONG  E&P Norway AS  0.983% 
 GDF SUEZ E&P Norway AS  0.304% 
 RWE Dea Norway AS  0.081% 
Source: (Gassco, 2012) 
*Petoro serves as the licensee for the Norwegian state’s direct 
financial interest (SDFI) in petroleum activities. 
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Appendix C  Historical income from the petroleum sector (in mill. NOK) 
Year Ordinary 
tax 
Special 
tax 
Production 
fee 
Area 
fee 
Enviromental 
taxes 
Net cash 
flow SDFI 
Dividend 
Statoil 
1971   14     
1972   42     
1973   69     
1974   121     
1975   208     
1976 1 143 4 712 99    
1977 1 694 725 646 57    
1978 1 828 727 1 213 51    
1979 3 399 1 492 1 608 53    
1980 9 912 4 955 3 639 63    
1981 13 804 8 062 5 308 96   0 
1982 15 036 9 014 5 757 76   368 
1983 14 232 8 870 7 663 75   353 
1984 18 333 11 078 9 718 84   798 
1985 21 809 13 013 11 626 219  -8 343 709 
1986 17 308 9 996 8 172 198  -11 960 1 245 
1987 7 137 3 184 7 517 243  -10 711 871 
1988 5 128 1 072 5 481 184  -9 133 0 
1989 4 832 1 547 7 288 223  755 0 
1990 12 366 4 963 8 471 258  7 344 800 
1991 15 021 6 739 8 940 582 810 5 879 1 500 
1992 7 558 7 265 8 129 614 1 916 3 623 1 400 
1993 6 411 9 528 7 852 553 2 271 159 1 250 
1994 6 238 8 967 6 595 139 2 557 5 1 075 
1995 7 854 10 789 5 884 552 2 559 9 259 1 614 
1996 9 940 12 890 6 301 1 159 2 787 34 959 1 850 
1997 15 489 19 582 6 220 617 3 043 40 404 1 600 
1998 9 089 11 001 3 755 527 3 229 14 572 2 940 
1999 5 540 6 151 3 222 561 3 261 25 769 135 
2000 21 921 32 901 3 463 122 3 047 98 219 1 702 
2001 41 465 64 316 2 481 983 2 862 125 439 5 746 
2002 32 512 52 410 1 320 447 3 012 74 785 5 045 
2003 36 819 60 280 766 460 3 056 67 482 5 133 
2004 43 177 70 443 717 496 3 309 80 166 5 222 
2005 61 589 103 294 360 224 3 351 98 602 8 139 
2006 78 015 133 492 42 2 308 3 405 125 523 12 593 
2007 70 281 116 233 0 764 3 876 111 235 14 006 
2008 88 802 150 839 0 1 842 3 684 153 759 16 940 
2009 61 501 103 733 0 1 470 2 262 95 339 15 489 
2010 58 830 96 779 0 1 373 2 186 104 053 12 818 
2011 78 243 127 693 0 1 517 2 225 127 775 13 350 
Source: (Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, 2013b) 
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